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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, constitutional issues involving the military
chaplaincy have progressed from a low simmer to a rolling boil. After decades
of little public attention, stories about the chaplaincy regularly reach the national
23news, cases proliferate in the courts,3 and new scholarly articles on the subject
appear regularly.4 The stories and lawsuits cover a wide array of legal ques-
2 Alan Cooperman, For Gods and Country: The Army Chaplain Who Wanted to Switch to
Wicca? Transfer Denied, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2007, at Cl; Neela Bannerjee, Proposal on Mili-
tary Chaplains and Prayer Holds Up Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A19; Sonja Barisic,
Navy Chaplain Guilty of Wearing Uniform at Protest, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 14, 2006; Alan
Cooperman, Military Wrestles with Disharmony Among Chaplains, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2005,
at Al; Laurie Goodstein, Evangelicals Are Growing Force In the Military Chaplain Corps, N. Y.
TIMES, July 12, 2005, at Al.
3 Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v.
England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2007); Weinstein
v. U.S. Air Force, 468 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (D.N.M. 2006); Adair v. England, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2006); Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 346 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2004).
4 David E. Fitzkee & Linell A. Letendre, Religion in the Military: Navigating the Channel
Between the Religion Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1 (2007); Richard D. Rosen, Katcoff v. Marsh at
Twenty-Two: The Military Chaplaincy and the Separation of Church and State, 38 U. TOL. L.
REv. 1137 (2007); William J. Dobosh, Jr., Coercion in the Ranks: The Establishment Clause
Implications of Chaplain-Led Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 WISc. L. REv. 1493;
Heather Cook, Service Before Self? Evangelicals Flying High at the U.S. Air Force Academy, 36
J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2007); Frank J. Ducoat, New Development, Self-Executing Irreparable Harm:
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England ("England I"), 8 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIG. 8
(2006); Kenneth J. Schweiker, Note, Military Chaplains: Federally Funded Fanaticism and the
[Vol. 110
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tions, from discrimination in the selection and promotion of chaplains, 5 to con-
straints on the conduct of chaplains' ministry,6 to the constitutionality of the
chaplaincy itself.7 Legal analysis of these issues has thus far proved somewhat
problematic because the military chaplaincy occupies a highly unusual position
in constitutional law.
Consider the basic structure of the military chaplaincy. The government
establishes professional standards for eligible clergy8 and decides which chap-
lains should be hired, promoted and discharged. 9 Chaplains engage in govern-
ment-funded worship, religious instruction and pastoral counseling. 0 More-
over, the government builds the houses of worship in which chaplains conduct
religious services, pays for hymnals and liturgical supplies and provides the
materials for religious instruction." These kinds of expenditures and employ-
ment decisions represent the core features of any definition of an "establishment
United States Air Force Academy, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIG. 5 (2006); Steven H. Aden, The
Navy's Perfect Storm: Has a Military Chaplaincy Forfeited Its Constitutional Legitimacy by Es-
tablishing Denominational Preferences?, 31 W. ST. U. L. REV. 185 (2004); William A. Wildhack
III, Navy Chaplains at the Crossroads: Navigating the Intersection of Free Speech, Free Exercise,
Establishment, and Equal Protection, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 217 (2005); Emilie Kraft Bindon, Com-
mentary, Entangled Choices: Selecting Chaplains for the United States Armed Forces, 56 ALA. L.
REv. 247 (2004).
5 Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 290; Wil-
kins v. United States, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41268 (S.D. Cal., June 29, 2005), aff'd, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 12060 (9th Cir. 2007).
6 Klingenschmitt v. Winter, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2339 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Ken Walker,
USMC Chaplain Who Took a Stand Says Navy Is Retaliating, BAPTIST PRESS, Jan. 16, 2007,
available at http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=24777.
7 William T. Cavanaugh, Jr., Note, The United States Military Chaplaincy Program: Another
Seam in the Fabric of our Society?, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181 (1993); Christopher Hitchens,
GI Jesus: The Real Problem with Military Chaplains, SLATE, Oct. 2, 2006, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2150801.
8 The armed services have adopted the inclusive phrase, "religious ministry professionals," to
characterize chaplains, but we will use the more familiar "clergy." See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, DIR. 1304.19, APPOINTMENT OF CHAPLAINS FOR THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS para. 4 (11
Jun. 2004) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 1304.19].
9 DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8; U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 1304.28, GUIDANCE FOR
THE APPOINTMENT OF CHAPLAINS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS (11 Jun. 2004) [hereinafter
DOD INSTR. 1304.28].
10 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 165-1, RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES: CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES ARMY, CHAPTER 4, ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF CHAPLAINS AND CHAPLAIN
ASSISTANTS (25 Mar. 2004) [hereinafter AR 165-1]; U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, POLICY DIR. 52-1,
CHAPLAIN SERVICE (2 Oct. 2006) [hereinafter AF POLICY DiR. 52-1]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY,
OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1 D, RELIGIOUS MINISTRY IN THE NAVY (6 May 2003) [hereinafter OPNAV
INSTR. 1730.1D].
II See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 165-18, RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES: CHAPLAINCY
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (21 Jan. 2000) [hereinafter DA PAM 165-18] (describing "how re-
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of religion." How, then, is the chaplaincy consistent with the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution's First Amendment?
To answer that question, courts and commentators generally turn to one
or more of the following paradigms:
* Establishment Clause history-resting on the Supreme
Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers,'2 which upheld the
constitutionality of the Nebraska state legislature's chaplaincy,
this paradigm focuses on the long history of the armed services'
chaplaincy as the foundation for its current legitimacy. 
3
e Public funding of religion-drawing from the Court's deci-
sions from Everson v. Board of Education14 through Lemon v.
Kurtzman1 5 to Agostini v. Felton'6 on government aid for reli-
gious enterprises, this paradigm examines the various tests used
by the Court to determine when government support for reli-
gious entities crosses a line into impermissible promotion of re-
ligion.
17
* Governmental display of religious messages-looking to the
Court's decisions on government presentation of religious sym-
bols, most prominently Lynch v. Donnelly,'" this paradigm asks
whether government-sponsored religious messages reflect un-
constitutional "endorsement," or permitted "acknowledgment,"
of religion.19
Although the historical approach to appraising the chaplaincy is useful
and relevant, it is not fully sufficient to answer the questions raised by today's
institution of the chaplaincy. The paradigms of no-funding and no-
endorsement-to the extent that they still shape the law-arise from circum-
stances wholly apart from those which give rise to the chaplaincy and to consti-
tutional questions about its scope and operation. An adequate approach for Es-
tablishment Clause analysis of the military chaplaincy requires a different
framework-one appropriate to those circumstances.
12 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
13 Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 232-33 (2d Cir. 1985).
14 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
16 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
17 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232-33.
18 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
19 Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
[Vol. 110
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Part II of this essay describes and analyzes Katcoff v. Marsh,2 ° the most
important decision on the constitutionality of the military chaplaincy. Part II of
the essay then turns to our contention that constitutional inquiry into the military
chaplaincy should begin from the basic insight, occasionally recognized by
courts, 2 1 that the military chaplaincy exists for the primary purpose of accom-
modating the religious needs of military personnel. As such, the chaplaincy
bears a family resemblance to other types of religious accommodations, such as
exemptions for religious entities from regulation of employment
22 or land use; 23
protections for religious exercises of prisoners24 or employees;2 5 and arrange-
ments for the religious instruction of public school students. 26
In a series of decisions spanning the past six decades,27 the Supreme
Court has considered Establishment Clause challenges to a variety of religious
accommodations. Despite the prevailing general sense of disorder in the uni-
verse of Religion Clause jurisprudence,28 the Court's accommodation decisions
represent a surprisingly coherent model. These decisions, taken together, sug-
gest that religious accommodations must satisfy four, linked constitutional
norms. First, is the accommodation a reasonable effort to relieve a government-
imposed burden on religious practice?29 Second, do beneficiaries of the ac-
20 755 F.2d at 232-33.
21 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 n.10 (1963) (discussing military chap-
laincy as justified by religious needs of military personnel). See also id. at 296-98 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (same); id. at 308-09 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (same); and Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 235-37.
22 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2006) (Religious
employer is exempt from prohibition on religion-based discrimination "with respect to the em-
ployment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities"). See also Corp.
of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge
to exemption for religious employer from Title VII's bar on religion-based discrimination in em-
ployment).
23 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc.
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1.
25 Title VII, § 7010) (definition of religion includes obligation to make reasonable accommo-
dations for employees' religious exercise). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63 (1977) (upholding a requirement of reasonable accommodations, but construing the obli-
gation narrowly). But see Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (holding unconstitu-
tional, on Establishment Clause grounds, a Connecticut statute that required employers to accom-
modate employees' need for religious Sabbath observance).
26 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding "released time" program in which pub-
lic school students are excused from school to attend religious instruction).
27 Id.; Caldor, 472 U.S. at 703; Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 327; Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687 (1994); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
28 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725 (2006); Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA.
L. REV. 1 (2007).
29 See infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
2007]
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commodation participate voluntarily?30 Third, is the accommodation available
on a denominationally-neutral basis?3' Fourth, does the accommodation impose
significant material burdens on third parties?
32
In Parts IV and V, we apply those criteria to constitutional challenges
affecting the military chaplaincy. Part IV deals with the constitutional assertion
that the chaplaincy as a whole offends the Establishment Clause. We suggest
that the institution of the chaplaincy itself should survive challenge, although
specific practices of the institution have less certain constitutional footings. We
turn to such particular challenges in Part V. There, we consider the services'
policies for hiring (accession), promotion and retention of chaplains. We also
examine the services' regulation of particular aspects of chaplains' ministry,
including the conduct of worship, prayer at official functions and pastoral care.
Through our examination of each of these facets of the military chaplaincy, we
attempt to show how the Establishment Clause standards for religious accom-
modations should guide the relevant inquiry and judgments. We believe that
consistent application of these standards will intelligently clarify and wisely
resolve the current and heated controversies surrounding the military chap-
laincy.
II. KATCoFF V. MARSH: CHALLENGING THE CHAPLAINCY
A. The Opinion in Katcoff
In 1985, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the
first-and to this date, the only-direct constitutional challenge to the military
chaplaincy. The lawsuit, Katcoff v. Marsh,3 3 alleged that the military chaplaincy
violated the Establishment Clause because a uniformed, government-financed
chaplaincy was not necessary to meet the religious needs of service members.
34
The district court dismissed the complaint, and the appellate court partly af-
firmed and partly reversed. 35 After a thorough review of the history and current
operation of the military chaplaincy, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that
a privately funded civilian chaplaincy could fulfill the military's requirements
for religious services.36 The court, thus, affirmed the lower court's decision that
the chaplaincy, considered in its entirety, does not violate the Constitution.37
30 See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
31 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
33 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985). See generally ISRAEL DRAZIN & CECIL B. CURREY, FOR GOD
AND COUNTRY: THE HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE ARMY CHAPLAINCY
(1995); Rosen, supra note 4.
34 755 F.2d at 229-30.
35 Id. at 237-38.
36 Id. at 236-37.
37 Id. at 237.
[Vol. 110
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The court remanded the case to the lower court, however, because it concluded
that the plaintiffs might be able to show that particular practices of the chap-
laincy, such as provision of religious services at domestic installations that
could readily be served by civilian chaplains, might violate the Establishment
Clause.38
Although the outcome in Katcoff seems correct, the appellate court's
searching examination of the details of the military chaplaincy came up short
when the court turned to application of the governing law. The court began its
analysis by citing the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers,39 which
upheld the practice of legislative prayer because of its "unambiguous and un-
broken history of more than 200 years." Judge Mansfield's opinion for the
Second Circuit panel claimed that the military chaplaincy shared a comparable
history.41 The court was not entirely persuaded by the historical justification for
the chaplaincy because it then turned to the Su reme Court's three-part Estab-
lishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman. Under Lemon, a statute must
have a secular purpose, must have a primary effect that does not advance or
inhibit religion and must not excessively entangle government and religion. The
court determined that the military chaplaincy would "fail to meet the Lemon v.
Kurtzman conditions, ' '43 but the court did not treat this failure as dispositive of
the chaplaincy's fate under the Establishment Clause."
n
Instead, the Court said that the Establishment Clause concerns reflected
in the Lemon test must be balanced against interests arising from both the War
Power Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.45 The court found in the War
Power Clause a requirement of significant judicial deference to Congress in
military affairs:
[W]hen a matter provided for by Congress in the exercise of its
war power and implemented by the Army appears reasonably
relevant and necessary to furtherance of our national defense it
should be treated as presumptively valid and any doubt as to its
constitutionality should be resolved as a matter of judicial com-
38 Id. at 237-38. Before any further hearing on the remand, the plaintiffs abandoned the case.
See DRAZIN & CURREY, supra note 33, at 203-04; RICHARD G. HUTCHESON, JR., THE CHURCHES
AND THE CHAPLAINCY 16 (rev. ed., U.S. Government Printing Office 1998).
39 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
40 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232 (discussing and quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).
41 Id.
42 Id. (discussing and quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
43 Id.
44 In this regard, Katcoff was following the Supreme Court's lead in the then-recent opinion in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), which had similarly declared that the Lemon standards
were guideposts, but were not always controlling. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
45 Katcoff, 755 F.2d. at 233 (discussing the War Powers Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Free
Exercise Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I).
2007]
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ity in favor of deference to the military's exercise of discre-
46tion.
Moreover, the court found the chaplaincy to be a necessary means of
avoiding violation of service members' rights under the Free Exercise Clause.47
By removing soldiers from their religious communities, the court reasoned, the
military has interfered with their opportunity to engage in religious activity, and,
thus, might be deemed to have infringed the service members' right to free ex-
ercise. 48 The chaplaincy provides the means through which Congress has insu-
lated the military from liability for such infringements of religious liberty.
49
Taken together, the court concluded, the concerns reflected in the War Power
and Free Exercise Clauses override more traditional principles of nonestablish-
ment.50 Thus, the military chaplaincy is justified as a necessary response in
"circumstances where the practice of religion would otherwise be denied as a
practical matter to all or a substantial number.
'51
B. Post-Katcoff Cases and Commentary-The Failure of Conventional
Paradigms
Subsequent constitutional challenges to the military chaplaincy have fo-
cused primarily on personnel issues and, in particular, the preferences allegedly
given to chaplains of certain faith groups over others for purposes of recruit-
ment, promotion and retention. In deciding these cases, courts have continued
with the struggle evident in Katcoff to find a coherent methodology for resolv-
ing Establishment Clause challenges to the military chaplaincy. For example, a
ruling of the D.C. Circuit in Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England
adopts the concept of governmental "endorsement" of religion as its preferred
standard for Establishment Clause scrutiny of the chaplaincy.53 In a recent and
promising judicial development, 54 the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
46 Id. at 234.
47 Id. at 234-35.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 235.
51 Id. at 237.
52 Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v,
England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Larsen v.
U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2007); Adair v. England, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2006).
53 454 F.3d 290, 302 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
54 Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 11. Judge Urbina published his opinion in Larsen within a few
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lumbia relied on a model of accommodation, akin to what we propose, when it
ruled that the U.S. Navy did not have to accept chaplain candidates in precise
proportion to the Navy's faith demographics.55
Legal commentators have generally taken the same route as pre-Larsen
courts in constitutional assessments of the military chaplaincy. These commen-
tators typically invoke some mix of the three major strands of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence-the historical approach in Marsh, the three-part Lemon
test, and the "endorsement" standard from the public display decisions, supple-
mented by the war powers and free exercise concerns reflected in Katcoff.5 6 The
resulting analysis tends to reveal the underlying uncertainty with respect to ap-
plicable legal standards. Nearly all commentators accept the judgment in Kat-
coff, that the institution survives facial challenge under the Establishment
Clause, but their explanation of that judgment and their examination of specific
practices of the chaplaincy are deeply unpersuasive because of the difficulty of
explaining why any particular standard should be applied in a given context.
This struggle of courts and commentators is understandable. The field
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is littered with tests,57 and the military
chaplaincy seems to possess elements drawn from the full range of problems
that implicate disestablishment principles. What other arm of government fi-
nances religious instruction, erects religious displays, and engages in officially
sponsored prayer and worship? Unfortunately, the tests appropriate to such
contexts, which are most often invoked by courts and commentators in assess-
ments of the military chaplaincy, are ill-suited to this task.
The argument from history, found in Marsh v. Chambers,58 has been
applied by the Supreme Court only to legislative chaplaincies, 59 and seems to
rest on the specific characteristics of religious activity in such chaplaincies.
Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that the challenged invocations were brief
55 Id. at 31-33.
56 See Michael J. Benjamin, Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue: Legal Analysis of Religion
Issues in the Army, 1998-NOV Army Law 1, 2-8; Aden, supra note 4, at 188-98; Bindon, supra
note 4, at 273-83; Cavanaugh, supra note 7 at 199-218; Cook, supra note 4, at 19-25; Wildhack,
supra note 4, at 225-29.
57 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (three-part test for determining imper-
missible governmental involvement with religion); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-792
(1983) (historically accepted practices withstand Establishment Clause challenges); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Establishment Clause pro-
tects against governmental endorsement of religion); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 655-679 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part) (Estab-
lishment Clause protects against government-coerced religious exercises); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 230 (1997) (revision of Lemon test).
58 463 U.S. at 790-792.
59 There has been a recent flurry of lower court decisions about prayer in state and local legis-
lative bodies. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006); Simpson v. Chesterfield
County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, S.C.,
376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004); Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999);
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998).
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and non-sectarian, and were conducted in a setting in which listeners were free
to come and go as they pleased.60 In the absence of such characteristics, the
Court indicated, the historical foundation of the legislative chaplaincy would be
insufficient to withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny. 61 The military chap-
laincy, however, involves much more extensive religious activity than the cere-
monial practice contemplated in Marsh. As we discuss later, military chaplains
may be called upon to perform ceremonial functions, in some ways akin to leg-
islative prayer.62 Such functions, however, do not comprise the core of the
chaplains' obligations, which involve the provision of specifically religious ser-
vices.
Nor is the three-part test from Lemon63 _or its more recent revision in
Agostini v. Felton64-a particularly useful standard for assessing the military
chaplaincy. The questions asked in Lemon and Agostini focus on the govern-
ment's involvement in religious activity undertaken with the government's fi-
65nancial assistance. At first glance, the chaplaincy would seem to fall within
this ambit because the government does spend money on the chaplaincy. But
the analytic focus of Lemon and Agostini is quite different. Through the pur-
pose and effect prongs of the standards derived from those decisions, courts
determine whether the government bears responsibility for the religious activity
of government-supported, private religious organizations. 66  Ordinarily, gov-
ernment support does not convert the conduct of a private entity into "state ac-
tion" for constitutional purposes.67 Under the Establishment Clause, however,
the government may be held responsible for the religious activities of state-
funded private entities, and the Lemon and Agostini standards are intended to
determine when such responsibility is fairly assigned to the government. The
Lemon and Agostini tests, thus, focus on factors peculiarly suited to the relation-
ship between government and private religious institutions, such as the extent of
government-imposed safeguards on religious use of funds, the monitoring of
compliance with those safeguards and the risks of entanglement between gov-
ernment and religion. 68 In contrast, the government funds the military chap-
60 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-94.
61 Id. at 790 ("Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of
constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than simply historical patterns.").
62 See infra notes 431-34 and accompanying text.
63 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
64 521 U.S. 203, 230 (1997).
65 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-30.
66 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230 (An Establishment Clause analysis of government aid to religion
is undertaken in order to determine "whether any use of that aid to indoctrinate religion could be
attributed to the State.").
67 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
68 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 844-845, 857-863 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (restating Lemon-Agostini test in context of aid to religious schools).
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laincy for the specific purpose of delivering religious services, so application of
the Lemon-Agostini tests seems conceptually misplaced.
The Establishment Clause tests applied in challenges to public displays
of religion are equally ill-suited to scrutiny of the military chaplaincy. From
Lynch69 through the Court's most recent decisions in this context, McCreary
County 70 and Van Orden,71 the disputes have centered on the question of
whether the display reflects a message of government promotion ("endorse-
ment") of religion or mere "acknowledgment" of the historical-i.e., arguably
non-religious-significance of the religious display.7 2 The religious content of
the military chaplaincy, however, can hardly be deemed a matter of reasonable
doubt. The government erects chapels and pays the salaries of chaplains pre-
cisely because of the religious significance of such places and people. Attempts
by courts and commentators to determine whether practices or policies of the
chaplaincy reflect constitutionally impermissible endorsement of religion are
thus doomed to failure.7 3
Perhaps sensing the conceptual inadequacy of these traditional para-
digms, the appellate court in Katcoff ultimately appealed to two additional con-
stitutional provisions-the grant of War Powers and the Free Exercise Clause-
in finding that the military chaplaincy withstood Establishment Clause chal-
lenge.74 Although reliance on these clauses is understandable, neither supports a
credible theory of how and why Establishment Clause interests must give way.75
The argument based on the grant of War Powers fails to recognize an essential
characteristic of the Establishment Clause. Unlike other provisions of the bill of
rights, such as the protections for speech or religious exercise, the Establishment
Clause has not traditionally been treated as subject to a "public necessity" limi-
tation.76 In other words, the state may not successfully respond to an Establish-
69 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
70 McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
71 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
72 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677 (citing a long list of "illustrations of the Government's
acknowledgment of our religious heritage and governmental sponsorship of graphic manifesta-
tions of that heritage"); cf id. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (nativity scene represents official
endorsement rather than acknowledgment of Christianity).
73 As Alexander Bickel wrote years ago in a different context, "No answer is what the wrong
question begets .... " ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 103 (Bobbs-Merrill
1962).
74 Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
75 This failure of explanation is highlighted in a panel member's partial dissent, objecting to
the remand for evaluation of specific practices of the chaplaincy). Id. at 238 (Meskill, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
76 Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-29 (1972) (deciding that a state's interest
in compulsory school attendance did not outweigh religious liberty interest of Old Order Amish
community in withholding children from school after eighth grade), with Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704-06 (1994) (after finding that creation of special school district
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ment Clause claim by an appeal to the public benefits generated by the chal-
lenged religious activity.
77
With respect to the argument based on the Free Exercise Clause, the
court in Katcoff significantly overestimated the strength of service members'
free exercise rights. The court suggested that the military would be constitu-
tionally required to provide some form of chaplaincy in order to avoid infring-
ing the free exercise rights of soldiers who would be separated from their places
and communities of religious worship.78 Such an overestimate was understand-
able in 1985, but not today. In the intervening twenty years, the Court has dra-
matically restricted the scope of the constitutional protection for Free Exercise
Clause. The Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith79 refused to extend strict judicial scrutiny to "gen-
eral rules of neutral applicability" that happen to burden religious exercise.8°
Virtually all military regulations that hinder service members' religious exercise
represent such "general rules," including deployment orders, restrictions on off-
base travel and duty schedules. None of these types of regulations specifically
target religious practices for disfavor, but all are capable of imposing serious
obstacles to religious exercise.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 81 may provide service members
with some degree of protection for religious practices. The scope of that pro-
tection, however, would likely be limited by the Court's strong deference to
military authorities, reflected in Goldman v. Weinberger.83 RFRA purports to
restore the pre-Smith law, of which Goldman remains a part, so there is no rea-
for Orthodox Jewish community violates the Establishment Clause, Court does not balance that
judgment against state interest in having such a school district).
77 See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 301-04 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(Establishment Clause not subject to same balancing tests as other First Amendment rights, and,
thus, violation is by definition an irreparable injury for purposes of preliminary injunctive relief).
78 In Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 234, the court wrote: "Unless the Army provided a chaplaincy it
would deprive the soldier of his right ... under the Free Exercise Clause to practice his freely
chosen religion." The court appears to link this obligation with "compulsory" military service, but
the draft ended a decade before Katcoff was decided, and elsewhere, the court treats the obligation
as one owed to all service members, whether volunteers or draftees. But see Larsen v. United
States Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 31-33 (D.D.C. 2007) (ruling that military chaplaincy program is
not a mandatory accommodation of service members' free exercise rights, but a permissive ac-
commodation of service members' free exercise interests).
79 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
80 Id. at 878-82.
81 42 U.S.C § 2000bb. RFRA still applies in full force to the federal government. The Court's
decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), held RFRA unconstitutional as applied
to the states because the Act exceeded the powers of Congress under the 14th Amendment.
82 Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (apply-
ing RFRA to the federal government).
83 475 U.S. 503 (1986). In Goldman, the Court refused to require the military to accommodate
an officer's religious interest in wearing a yarmulke.
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son to believe that RFRA protects free exercise rights in the military any more
than the First Amendment does.84
The reliance in Katcoff on free exercise interests places the constitu-
tional analysis in the appropriate framework, as does the court's decision to re-
mand the case for determination of the practices "reasonably necessary" to meet
85service members' religious needs. What the court lacked, however, was a
model of Establishment Clause review that more directly addressed the issues
raised by a government program that purports to address specific religious
needs. Such a model does exist, although in 1985 it was far less developed in
the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence than it is today.
86
Over the past six decades, the Supreme Court has decided a significant number
of cases involving Establishment Clause challenges to governmental "accom-
modations" of religious practices otherwise burdened by the government. After
a brief survey of these decisions, we sketch out the model of Establishment
Clause analysis that they embody.
87
HI. THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
A. The Leading Decisions on Accommodation of Religion
The concept of accommodation first appears in the Court's 1952 deci-
sion, Zorach v. Clauson8 8 which upheld a program of "released time" religious
84 Moreover, the court in Katcoff suggested that service members' free exercise rights might
offset possible Establishment Clause violations. Even if that were so, which we doubt, statutory
rights under RFRA are not constitutionally based, and would not therefore have the same offset-
ting force. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 508-09 (RFRA exceeds scope of protection accorded by the
Free Exercise Clause).
85 Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 237-38 (2d. Cir. 1985).
86 Indeed, the three leading Supreme Court decisions on religious accommodations appeared
in the four years immediately following the appellate court decision in Katcoff. Estate of Thorn-
ton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987);
Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
87 The leading secondary commentary on accommodations includes Douglas Laycock, Regula-
tory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment
Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793 (2006); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and Equal
Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1007 (2001); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Relig-
ion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. I. One of the co-authors of this
article has taken a generally negative view of religion-specific accommodations. See Ira C. Lupu,
The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstruct-
ing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991). Both of Professor Lupu's anti-accommodation articles, however, are
like Professor Bressman's article in that they have criticized those accommodations that single out
religion for favored treatment. The military chaplaincy does not fit that description because the
military similarly responds to the needs of service members for many other kinds of social experi-
ences, including athletics and secular cultural experience.
88 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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instruction that was operated by the New York public schools. 89 On approval
from their parents, schoolchildren were released from public schools in order to
receive religious instruction.9" The instruction was conducted and funded by a
variety of religious institutions and offered outside of the schools. 91 During the
period for religious instruction, those students whose parents did not consent to
religious instruction remained in school.9 2  Providers of religious instruction
informed the school of any student who had been released into this program, but
had failed to report for religious instruction.93
Plaintiffs brought an Establishment Clause challenge to the program,
arguing that it effectively made the public schools full partners in the enterprise
of religious instruction.94 The plaintiffs had reason to be optimistic about their
claim because four years earlier, the Supreme Court had held unconstitutional a
similar program in McCollum v. Board of Education.95 There, the Supreme
Court enjoined a program under which teachers of religion, representing a vari-
ety of faiths, came to the public schools for one period each week.96 Parents
could elect for their children to receive instruction from a specific teacher; those
students who were not enrolled in religious instruction remained at school (but
typically were not given alternative instruction during the period).97 By a vote
of 8-1, the Court ruled that the program violated the Establishment Clause
through its conferral of support, both material and otherwise, on religious educa-
tion.98
In Zorach, however, a 6-3 majority rejected the Establishment Clause
challenge, and upheld the New York released time program.99 The two pro-
grams are, however, distinguishable: in the Illinois scheme, the teachers of re-
ligion used public school classrooms and were screened by school personnel,
while the New York religion classes took place outside the schools and gener-
ally involved less school supervision.' °° The major conceptual difference be-
tween the cases is Justice Douglas's introduction of the idea of accommodation.
Although the Court's opinion is best known for Douglas's comment, "We are a
89 Id. at 312-14.
90 Id. at 308. The procedures and forms for parental approval are detailed in the lower court
opinion in the case Zorach v. Clauson, 99 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
91 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308 n.1.
92 Id. at 321 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing requirement that non-participating stu-
dents remain in school during released time religious instruction).
93 Id. at 308.
94 Id. at 309-10.
95 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
96 Id. at 207-12.
97 Id. at 207-09, 207 n.2.
98 Id. at 210-12.
99 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 306 (1952).
100 Id. at 311-12, 315.
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religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,"' 10 the rest of
that paragraph holds a more enduring legacy of the decision. We quote at length
from the relevant portion of Douglas's majority opinion:
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.
For it then respects the religious nature of our people and ac-
commodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold
that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a require-
ment that the government show a callous indifference to reli-
gious groups ....
.. . In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for reli-
gious instruction and the force of the public school was used to
promote that instruction. Here, as we have said, the public
schools do no more than accommodate their schedules to a pro-
gram of outside religious instruction. We follow the McCollum
case. But we cannot expand it to cover the present released
time program unless separation of Church and State means that
public institutions can make no adjustments of their schedules
to accommodate the religious needs of the people. 10 2
The concept of accommodation, thus, grows from a fairly common meaning of
the term-to make room for something within a schedule. The schedule, of
course, was the public school day, and the Court's reasoning started with the
basic assertion that schools regularly release individual students for religious
observances as requested by their parents. 0 3 The schools should be free to do
the same on a larger scale, releasing not just isolated students but any whose
parents wished their children to receive such instruction. By making room in
the schedule, the government opened an opportunity for individuals to choose to
engage in religious activity.1 4 Thus, the government's role was responsive to
parental need, rather than motivated by the state's own agenda in support of
religious instruction. 0 5 The state acted to facilitate private religiosity, rather
101 Id. at 313. At the time, Justice Douglas was considering-not for the first time-a run for
the presidency. See BRUCE ALAN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS 212-32 (2003).
102 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-15.
103 Id. at 313.
104 Id. at 311.
lOs Id. at 313.
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than to offer religious content of the state's own devising.'0 6 Moreover, the pro-
gram was formally open to all faiths. 1
The Court's opinion leaves much to be desired. Not once did the Court
address the question of why parents need this particular accommodation to pro-
vide their children with religious instruction. Presumably, the length of the
school day did not preclude religious instruction before or after regular class-
room hours. Perhaps parents and children were not as likely to make use of
their non-school time for religious education.'0 8  In dissent, Justice Jackson
asked why the school day could not simply be shortened, and such children as
were willing could attend religious instruction. °9 He then provided the answer:
"But that suggestion is rejected upon the ground that if they are made free many
students will not go to the Church."" 0  Seen from that perspective, the released
time program functions more as a public stimulus and enforcement mechanism
for religious education. 1
The Court's opinion also demonstrated a complete lack of interest in the
experience of students who do not attend religious instruction during the desig-
nated period. It noted only that students were not "forced" to participate in reli-
gious instruction." 2 As Frankfurter argued in dissent, the school may indeed
close its doors during the period of religious instruction, but "they are closed
upon those students who do not attend the religious instruction, in order to keep
them within the school." ' 1 3 The obligation to remain in school, Frankfurter as-
serted, imposed a burden on non-participating schoolchildren.' 14 The children
faced a choice-they could remain in school for extra work, or at least extra
time in "captivity," or they could agree to participate in religious instruction.
115
This choice, Justice Frankfurter suggested, raised the significant possibility that
the state had established religion through its released time program." 6
106 Id. at 314.
107 Id. at 309 n. 1.
108 Id. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
11o Id.
"' Id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting). A student enrolled in religious instruction who failed to
appear without excuse would be truant, and would be in violation of the state's compulsory atten-
dance law. Id. at 308, 309 n.1.
112 Id. at 311-12 (majority opinion).
113 Id. at 321 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. (arguing that the Court failed to consider possible coercion of students). In his dissent,
Justice Jackson made essentially the same argument against the released time plan as Justice
Frankfurter. Because the state releases from "captivity" only those students who are willing to
receive religious instruction, and consequently "imprisons" those who are unwilling to receive
religious instruction, the state has unconstitutionally exercised its coercive powers in support of
religion. Id. at 323-25 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Professor Lupu's experience with the program as
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Whether or not the Court correctly decided Zorach, the decision created
the seed of the accommodation concept. Zorach contains within it both the con-
cept's justification' 17 and, as explicated in the dissenting opinions, the limita-
tions later to be imposed on it. 11 Pushing back against the Everson decision's
embrace of a strongly separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause,"
9
Zorach advanced an alternative history of the Clause that had first been articu-
lated in Justice Reed's McCollum dissent. 20 Under this history, the founders'
decision not to establish a national church went hand-in-hand with a general
agreement that religion deserves great respect in the polity.' 21 Such respect in-
cludes official recognition of the importance of religion to the citizenry, made
concrete in Thanksgiving proclamations, legislative prayers and other public
ceremonies that include mention of the divine. 122 Accommodation of religion
played, and continues to play, a central role in this alternative to strict separa-
tionism. Through accommodation of religion, the government demonstrates
respect for the religious lives of its people.
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 23 the Court held
unconstitutional the practice of prayer and devotional Bible reading in public
schools. For our purposes, the case is important because Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinion offers the first sustained exploration of the concept of accom-
modation.' 24 Those who defended the practice of prayer and Bible reading had
argued that the practice should be upheld under Zorach as a permissible ac-
a child in upstate New York confirms this experience of "imprisonment." Ira C. Lupu, The Trou-
ble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743, 743-44 n.4 (1992).
117 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 311-15.
118 Id. at 315-25 (dissenting opinions).
119 See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947) (reviewing the history of
disestablishment in colonial era and early republic). See also id. at 33-42 (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing) (focusing on debates in Virginia over disestablishment).
120 Zorach, 343 U.S. 306, 312-14. See also McCoilum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 244-48
(1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
121 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14.
122 Id. at 312-13. The paradigmatic statement of this "alternative" Establishment Clause history
can be found in the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-
114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (Lambeth Press 1982) (challenging separa-
tionist interpretation of constitutional history).
123 374 U.S. 203 (1963). We omit discussion here of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961), in which the Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the Maryland
Sunday closing laws. The Court's decision in McGowan touched on the idea of accommodation,
but the opinion depended almost entirely on the judgment that the originally religious purposes of
Sunday closing laws had been transformed into secular grounds for a uniform day of rest. Id. at
446-52. The Court reasoned that the choice of Sunday as the day of rest merely recognizes and
coordinates the habits of the vast majority of people. Id. at 451-52.
124 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294-305 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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commodation of the religious needs of students enrolled in public schools.' 25 In
the majority opinion, written by Justice Clark, the Court focused on the gov-
ernment's obligation of religious neutrality, which the Court deemed to have
been violated by the Bible reading and prayer.' 26 Through the schools' use of
the Lord's Prayer and King James Version of the Bible, the Court held that the
government was intentionally advancing one set of religions over others, and
also advancing religion over non-religion.
127
In his concurring opinion, which was quoted at length in Katcoff, 128
Justice Brennan directly confronted the school officials' defense of the chal-
lenged practice as an accommodation of religion. 129 Brennan used the military
chaplaincy as the paradigmatic form of a permissible accommodation, and
against that form he contrasted prayer and Bible reading in schools.' 30 His con-
currence noted several features of the military chaplaincy that save it from un-
constitutionality. First, the chaplaincy responds to a significant burden on ser-
vice members' free exercise of religion; the source of this burden is their isola-
tion from ordinary opportunities for civilian worship.'3 1 Second, the chaplain's
religious services are provided only to those who ask to receive them, and those
who do not seek religious services suffer no penalty for that decision. 32 Bren-
nan reasoned that the schools' practice of prayer and Bible reading lacked either
of those characteristics. 33 Students attending public schools suffer no material
isolation from ordinary opportunities for worship or religious instruction so the
government cannot plausibly claim that its religious exercises are designed to
alleviate a government-imposed burden.' 34 Moreover, the religious experience
is provided to all students, not just to those who choose to receive it. 135 Taken
together, these features of the challenged religious exercises suggest that they
125 Justice Stewart's dissent develops this argument at some length; he contends that the prac-
tice should be upheld because it permissibly advances the free exercise interest of parents "who
affirmatively desire to have their children's school day open with the reading of passages from the
Bible." kL at 312-13 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 223-25 (majority opinion).
127 Id. at 224 (noting that the permission to use the "Catholic Douay version" for readings did
not save the practice from unconstitutionality because the practice inevitably places the power of
the state behind a particular understanding of religion).
128 Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234-35 n.4 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at
296-98 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
129 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294-304 (Brennan, J., concurring).
130 Id. at 298-99.
131 Id. at 297-98.
132 Id. at 298.
133 Id. at 298-99.
134 Id. at 299.
135 Id. at 299-300 (comparing school students to legislators, who are free to absent themselves
from legislative prayer if they so choose, whereas schoolchildren do not enjoy that same freedom
to leave without penalty, "direct or indirect").
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were intended to further religious purposes of the government rather than to
accommodate the religious needs of schoolchildren. 1
36
Although Zorach and Schempp predate Katcoff, the Supreme Court's
most significant decisions involving religious accommodation did not appear
until the two years immediately following the Katcoff decision. 137 From 1985 to
1987, the Court considered the scope of government accommodation of religion
in four cases: Wallace v. Jaffree, 38 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,13 9 Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 140 and Texas Monthly v. Bullock.141 Although the
four cases involve quite disparate legal contexts-from school prayer to em-
ployment to taxation-each represents an Establishment Clause challenge to a
government program that purported to relieve a burden imposed on religious
activity.
In three of the decisions, Wallace, Estate of Thornton, and Texas
Monthly, the Court rejected the government's claim that the challenged program
was a constitutionally permissible accommodation of religion. Wallace in-
volved Alabama's moment of silence provisions, which permitted public school
teachers to "announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in dura-
tion shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such
period no other activities shall be engaged in."'14 3 A previously enacted Ala-
bama statute also contained a moment of silence provision, which used essen-
tially the same language except that it omitted the reference to voluntary
prayer. 44 The Court held that the newly enacted provision was unconstitutional
because it lacked a plausible secular purpose. 45 The prior moment of silence
provision fully achieved the state's expressed purpose of accommodating stu-
dents' private, voluntary religious exercise.1 46 Such accommodations, the
Court's opinion implied, must be directed toward, and limited to, the facilitation
136 Id. at 299.
137 Between Schemmp and Katcoff, the Court decided Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970). Walz upheld New York State's tax exemption for real estate owned and used for religious
purposes by religious organizations. Although the opinion uses the language of accommodation,
see 397 U.S. at 673, the exemption applied equally to secular non-profit organizations, and was
not designed to relieve a distinctive burden on religious entities. The Walz decision, thus, plays a
relatively insignificant part in the law of permissive accommodation because the exemption it
upheld is neither religion-favoring nor an affirmative provision of resources to religious entities.
138 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
139 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
140 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
141 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
142 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38; Estate of Thorton, 472 U.S. at 703; Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 1.
143 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40 n.1 (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
144 Id. at 58-59.
145 Id. at 59-60.
146 Id. at 59.
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of voluntary private religious activity. 147 Seen in that light, the subsequent en-
actment was superfluous, and was properly understood to promote prayer as the
state-preferred way to use the moment of silence.
148
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor further elaborated on the
difference between a permissible accommodation and the Alabama statute
struck down by the decision. 149 A moment of silence provision, O'Connor said,
may withstand constitutional scrutiny because the religious substance-if
any-of the student's meditation is supplied entirely by the student.150 The gov-
ernment may not specify any particular content of the meditation, or even that
the state prefers the students to use the time for religious meditation.' 51 The
shift from facilitation to promotion of religious exercise is determinative. So
long as the state allows the student to choose whether the moment will be used
for religious exercise and does not steer the student toward such exercise, the
accommodation satisfies the Establishment Clause. 152 O'Connor concluded that
Alabama's subsequent enactment of the statute that authorized "voluntary
prayer" moved the state from accommodation to promotion of religion.
153
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,154 the Supreme Court considered an Es-
tablishment Clause challenge to a Connecticut statute that required employers to
accommodate their employees' religious desire to observe a Sabbath. 155 The
statute provided that, "No person who states that a particular day of the week is
observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day.
An employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for
his dismissal.' 5 6 When Thornton, an employee, refused to work on his Sab-
bath, he was demoted to a lower position and he then resigned. 57 Invoking the
Connecticut Sabbath accommodation statute, Thornton filed a grievance against
Caldor, his employer. 58 Caldor defended by challenging the constitutionality of
147 Id.
148 Id. (citation omitted):
Appellants have not identified any secular purpose that was not fully served
by § 16-1-20 before the enactment of § 16-1-20.1. Thus, only two conclusions
are consistent with the text of § 16-1-20.1: (1) the statute was enacted to con-
vey a message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute
was enacted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute was nothing but
a meaningless or irrational act.
149 Id. at 67-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150 Id. at 72.
151 Id. at 73.
152 Id. at 73, 75-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
153 Id. at 76-79.
154 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
155 Id. at 707-08.
156 Id. at 706 (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) (1985) (footnote omitted).
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the statute, arguing that the statute had the primary effect of advancing religion,
and, thus, violated the Establishment Clause.1
59
The Supreme Court agreed with the employer and held the statute un-
constitutional. 60 Caldor is different from the earlier accommodation cases be-
cause the statute relieved its beneficiaries of a burden imposed by private parties
rather than by the government.' 6' In striking down the statute, the Court fo-
cused on the statute's "absolute and unqualified" grant of an accommodation to
sabbatarians. 62 The statute disregarded employers' attempts to make reason-
able accommodations, the economic costs of employers' compliance, and the
burdens such accommodations might impose on fellow employees. 63 By cate-
gorically preferring the religious exercise of sabbatarians to the interests of em-
ployers and fellow employees, the Court said, the statute crossed the line from
permissible accommodation to impermissible government favoritism for relig-
ion.' 64 A statute that required employers to make reasonable accommodations,
such as Title VII, would not suffer from the same defect because it simply re-
quired employers to take employees' religious needs into account alongside
other legitimate interests.
65
In Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 166 the Court held unconstitutional a Texas
statute under which religious publications were exempted from a sales tax that
was otherwise imposed on all publications. 167 The Court held that the exemp-
tion, limited only to religious publications, violated the Establishment Clause
because it lacked a plausible secular purpose. 168 The state claimed that the ex-
emption was necessary to protect the free exercise interests of religious publish-
ers, but the Court determined that the exemption failed to meet an essential re-
quirement for a constitutionally permissible accommodation of religion: the
159 Id. at 707.
160 Id. at 708, 710-11.
161 Caldor thus resembles TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), in which the Court up-
held the constitutionality of the requirement in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that private
employers reasonably accommodate the religious practices of employees, id. at 81-83, but con-
strued the accommodation requirement to demand only de minimis accommodations by employ-
ers. Id. at 84-85. Anything more demanding, the Court suggested, would impose an unconstitu-
tionally severe burden on employers to subsidize the religious experiences of their employees. Id.
162 Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709.
163 Id. at 708-10.
164 Id. at 7 10-11.
165 Id. at 711-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166 489 U.S. 1 (1989). For a recent decision applying the principles of Texas Monthly, see
Budlong v. Graham, 488 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (Georgia's sales and use tax exemp-
tions for Bibles and other specified religious literature violate the Free Press Clause of the First
Amendment because they single out religious literature for favored treatment.). This was the
ground for Justice White's concurring opinion in Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 25-26 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
167 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5.
168 Id. at 14-16.
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accommodation did not relieve any distinctive burden on religion. 169 The sales
tax may have added slightly to the price of the religious materials to be paid by
the consumer, and, therefore, may have reduced sales at the margin.170 But im-
position of the tax did not make it especially difficult or unlawful to sell the
literature.17' Nor did payment of the tax proceeds to the state conflict with the
tenets of any organization or group that was engaged in such transactions.
172
Without such a burden of significant lost sales or conflict with religious princi-
ples as its foundation, the exemption for religious publications represented an
unconstitutional benefit to religion.
17 3
In this quartet of accommodation decisions that appeared in the late
1980s, the Court upheld the challenged accommodation only once. ' 74 Corp. of
the Presiding Bishop v. Amos 175 involved a challenge to the exemption for reli-
gious employers, found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, from the prohibition
on religion-based employment discrimination. 7 6 An employee who had been
discharged from his position as building engineer of a religious facility owned
by the Mormon Church filed suit against the employer alleging religious dis-
crimination.177 He claimed that the complete exemption of religious employers
from the ban on religious discrimination violated the Establishment Clause by
giving a special benefit to religious employers. 78 The Court rejected the chal-
lenge, and held that the exemption was a permissible accommodation of relig-
ion.
179
In unanimously reaching this conclusion, the Court made two findings.
First, it determined that the exemption alleviated a distinctive burden on reli-
gious employers, for whom the restriction on religion-based employment was
more likely to affect core aspects of the enterprise than such restrictions im-
posed on a secular employer.180 Second, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment-formally similar to the one made in Wallace v. Jaffree-that a prior
statutory regime offered a sufficient accommodation for religious employers.'
8'
The Court disagreed and found that Congress had made a reasonable judgment
that the prior Title VII exemption, which included only employees responsible
169 Id. at 17-19.
170 Id. at 24-25.
171 Id. at 24.
172 Id. at 18-19.
173 Id. at 17-18.
174 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 329 n.1 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l).
177 Id. at 330-31.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 336-38.
180 Id. at 338.
181 Id. at 335-36. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 489 U.S. 38, 58-60 (1985).
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for the employer's religious message, was administratively and substantively
insufficient to alleviate the burden on religious employers. 182 Whether Amos is
viewed as a religion-favoring accommodation, 83 or as we prefer, an accommo-
dation that equalizes the position of religious organizations with their secular
counterparts, 184 Amos represents a high-water mark for the law of permissive
accommodation.
Over the last twenty years, the Court has considered two additional
challenges to religious accommodations: Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v.
Grumet 85 and Cutter v. Wilkinson.'86 In Kiryas Joel, the Court held unconstitu-
tional a New York statute that created a special school district for a village oc-
cupied only by members of a particular religious group, the Satmar Hasidim.
187
The community had requested the state legislature to create such a public school
district, so that its disabled students could get the benefit of state assistance.
88
The Court determined that the statute alleviated a distinct burden on the reli-
gious practice of the community by freeing its disabled children from attending
school in a nearby town, where they experienced significant distress because of
their different dress and customs. 189 The statute, nevertheless, violated the Es-
tablishment Clause because the government failed to show that a similar ac-
commodation would have been provided to other religious groups.190 Moreover,
the Court found the accommodation unnecessary, as secular alternatives might
have alleviated the community's burden without requiring the creation of the
special district. 191
182 Amos, 483 U.S. at 336-37.
183 See McConnell, supra note 87, at 692-93.
184 The Title VII exemption for religion-based hiring by religious organizations is an equalizer
because other cause-oriented organizations remain entirely free to discriminate in favor of those
who subscribe to their cause. For example, political parties are free to hire only those who are
politically loyal to the party, feminist organizations may insist that their employees be feminists,
and so on. Similarly, the inclusion of student religious clubs in the class of student organizations
to which public schools must give "equal access" if the schools permit noncurricular clubs repre-
sents an accommodation for religious clubs equal to that provided their secular counterparts. The
Supreme Court upheld the Equal Access Act, which codified this obligation of public schools, in
Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
185 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
186 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
187 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 696.
188 The non-disabled students in the Village attended a private, Hasidic academy. Id. at 687.
At the time, the Court's prior ruling in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) made it unconstitu-
tional for the state to give the private, religious academy any state aid for the education of disabled
children. The Court later overruled Aguilar in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997).
189 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 692, 711, 724.
190 Id. at 702-07 (majority opinion).
191 Id. at 707-09. These might have included provision for special education in a neighboring
public school district, accomplished in a way that addressed the fears of the Satmar Hasidic chil-
dren. See id. at 711-712 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Martha Minow, The Constitution and
the Subgroup Question, 71 IND. L.J. 1, 19-23 (1995) (discussing fears of Satmar Hasidic children).
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In its most recent foray into the area of religious accommodations, the
Court rejected a challenge to part of the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 92 In its relevant provision, RLUIPA protects the
religious exercise of "institutionalized persons," including prisoners, by requir-
ing the state to afford reasonable accommodations to the sincere religious prac-
tices of such persons. 193 The State of Ohio claimed that RLUIPA violated the
Establishment Clause by requiring the state to prefer the religious interests of
inmates over secular interests of others. 194  A unanimous Court rejected the
state's claim, and found that the statute was a permissible accommodation.' 95
Citing Amos, the Court determined that the statute responded to a class of dis-
tinct burdens on religion caused by the state's incarceration of those protected
by the act.
19 6
Most importantly, the Court distinguished Ohio's facial challenge to the
statute from potential as-applied challenges that might be brought in the fu-
ture. 197 The Court ruled that RLUIPA is capable of being administered constitu-
tionally, but is susceptible to as-applied challenges if specific accommodations
exceed the scope permitted under the Establishment Clause. 198 The Court said
that applications of RLUIPA might violate the Establishment Clause if such
accommodations manifested denominational favoritism or imposed significant
material burdens on third parties, whether guards or fellow inmates. 199 To en-
sure that accommodations do not impose such burdens, the Court instructed the
lower courts that RLUIPA should be interpreted with appropriate deference to
judgments of prison officials about the safety, security and welfare of those
within the prison environment.2 °°
B. Drawing Principles from the Court's Decisions
Although the decisions from Zorach to Cutter have arisen in a wide
range of contexts, a set of consistent themes emerges from them. As we elabo-
192 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713-14 (2005) (affirming constitutionality of RLUIPA's
provision concerning the religious exercise of persons confined in government institutions, 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(l)-(2)). The provision concerning religious land uses was not before the
Court.
193 42 U.S.C. § 2000-cc-l(a)(1)-(2), quoted in Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712 ("No government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution," unless the burden furthers "a compelling governmental interest," and does so by "the
least restrictive means.").
194 Id. at 712, 717-18.
195 Id. at 713-14.
196 Id. at 720-21.
197 Id. at 725.
198 Id. at 722, 725-26.
199 Id. at 722-23.
200 Id. at 725-26.
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rate below, the Court has relied on four criteria to distinguish permissible from
impermissible accommodations.
1. The Accommodation Must Relieve a Significant Government-
Imposed Burden on the Private Exercise of Religious Freedom
The challenged accommodations in Wallace and Texas Monthly failed
to meet this criterion, although they failed in subtly different ways. In Wallace,
the Court determined that any conceivable burden imposed on students by the
compulsory school day had been relieved by the previous moment of silence
provision, which set aside quiet time for students to use as they chose. 20 1 And in
Texas Monthly, the tax exemption did alleviate a financial burden on the sale of
religious publications-payment of the sales tax-but that burden was trivial,
and was indistinguishable from the burden the sales tax imposed on non-
religious publications.20 2
Even if the accommodation responds to a government-imposed burden,
however, the accommodation may still fail to satisfy this first criterion if the
response is not reasonably tailored to that burden. Although the Court has not
required a narrow tailoring of relief to the underlying burden, some reasonable
and proportional relationship between the two is required.203 In his dissenting
opinion in Schempp, for example, Justice Stewart argued that the practice of
prayer and Bible reading accommodated students who were required to attend
school, and thus were limited in their opportunities for receiving religious in-
struction.2° In his concurrence, Justice Brennan expressed skepticism about the
existence of any such burden, and indicated that the purported accommoda-
tion-government controlled prayer and scripture reading-lacked any reason-
able connection to the alleged burden on students.20 5 In Kiryas Joel, the Court
focused primarily on the denominational favoritism represented by the accom-
modation, but it also determined that the state might have found other, constitu-
tionally preferable ways to alleviate the burden imposed on the religious com-
munity.2 °
By contrast, in Amos, the Court accorded a measure of deference to
Congress in setting the terms for the accommodation of religious employers
201 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985). See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying
text.
202 Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1989). See supra notes 166-73 and accompa-
nying text.
203 See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987) (assessing
the relationship between expanded religious employer exemption under Title VII and the burden
imposed on religious employers by the original, narrower Title VII exemption).
204 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 311-13 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing). See supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
205 Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
206 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-08 (1994).
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under Title VII. 20 7 The Court acknowledged that Congress could have-indeed
did at one time-provide a narrower exemption for such employers, but the pre-
sent and broader accommodation, nonetheless, represented a reasonable means
of alleviating the government-imposed burden on employers because the nar-
rower exemption had led to incomplete relief from the religious burden of com-
plying with Title VII. 208
2. The Accommodation Must Facilitate Private and Voluntary
Religious Practices
This criterion may seem obvious, but it illuminates a core aspect of ac-
commodations. At its most basic level, an accommodation provides an oppor-
tunity for voluntary, private religious exercise. The government does not spec-
ify the content of that religious exercise, or even specify that the opportunity
created should be used for religious exercise. Thus, for example, a moment of
silence provision sets aside a time in the school day in which students may
choose to pray, but the time may equally be used by students to meditate on any
topic. The provision at issue in Wallace failed on this criterion because it at-
tempted to specify how the moment of silence should be used.2°9 This criterion
is especially important in distinguishing accommodations from other govern-
mental practices involving religion, such as public religious displays, which
have sometimes been defended as accommodations.21 ° Such displays are not
properly viewed as accommodations because they embody official rather than
private choices of religious content.
3. The Accommodation Must Be Available on a Denominationally
Neutral Basis
This criterion is related to, and equally fundamental as, the requirement
that the religious practice accommodated must be private and voluntary.
Through the accommodation, the government provides an opportunity for pri-
vately chosen religious practice, but the government does not specify which
religions may avail themselves of the accommodation. The requirement of neu-
trality does not mean that all faiths must find the accommodation equally useful.
Some religious communities, for example, may want to participate with public
schools in a released-time program for religious instruction, like the one upheld
by the Court in Zorach, while others might elect not to do so. Some religious
prisoners may feel the need to seek accommodations under RLUIPA, while the
regimen of prison life may not impose such a need on others. What is crucial,
207 Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36.
208 Id.
209 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72-73, 84 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
210 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677-78 (1984) (equating "accommodation" and
"acknowledgment" of religion in upholding public display).
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however, is that the accommodation is actually available for all to use if desired.
In Kiryas Joel, the Court struck down the accommodation because it found that
the state legislature was highly unlikely to have made a similar accommodation
for other religious communities that might find themselves similarly bur-
dened.21'
4. The Accommodation Must Not Impose Significant Burdens on
Third Parties
In some respects, the basis for this criterion is the least obvious, al-
though it dominated the Court's rulings in both Estate of Thornton and Cutter.
In his scholarly work on accommodation, Judge (then-Professor) Michael
McConnell suggested that the limit on third-party burdens relates primarily to
concerns about religious favoritism. 212 An accommodation that systematically
alleviates burdens on the religious and imposes a disproportionate cost of that
accommodation on third parties, McConnell argued, grants the protected reli-
gious exercise an improper privilege.213 The Court's decision in Estate of
Thornton, which McConnell describes as a situation in which "the burden on the
nonbeneficiaries is disproportionate to the effect on the believer,, 214 provides a
good example of this concern about favoring religion.215
Moreover, in some contexts, the imposition of burdens on third parties
may pressure such parties to participate in the accommodated religious activity.
This concern animated Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Zorach, in which he ar-
gued that the captivity of non-participating children created public pressure on
those children to engage in the religious instruction.216
The strength of this criterion is uncertain because it has been applied in
relatively few decisions. Nonetheless, it could have dramatic consequences for
certain accommodations. For example, the State of Alabama exempts religious
217day care providers from state licensing requirements, thus creating a signifi-cant competitive disadvantage for secular day care centers that must satisfy
211 512 U.S. at 702-07.
212 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: an Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 685, 702,05 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell's Response to the
Critics]; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 37-39
(1985).
213 McConnell's Response to the Critics, supra note 212, at 703.
214 Id.
215 Id.; Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985).
216 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320-21 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also id. at
323-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting); McConnell's Response to the Critics, supra note 212, at 705 (if
schools fail to provide secular options for students who do not want to use released time for reli-
gious instruction, the state may be creating an incentive for students to participate in religious
instruction).
217 See Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation as Legal Exemptions Grow, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at Al (describing Alabama system of regulating day care centers).
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these requirements. And the land use portions of RLUIPA, which accord sig-
nificant protections to religious properties from zoning and other property regu-
218lations, may, in some circumstances, result in the imposition of substantial
burdens on the interests of neighboring owners and users of land.
Within the boundaries of these four criteria, the government has consid-
erable discretion with respect to permissive accommodations of religion. In Part
IV below, we analyze the military chaplaincy in light of this paradigm of reli-
gious accommodation.
IV. THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY AS ACCOMMODATION
In this part, we begin by describing the legally salient features of the
military chaplaincy. We then apply the Establishment Clause criteria for reli-
gious accommodations to the chaplaincy as a whole.
The "military chaplaincy" actually consists of three distinct institutions:
the Chaplains Corps of the Army, the Chaplains Corps of the Navy, and the Air
Force Chaplains Service.219 (Navy chaplains also serve the Marine Corps, Coast
Guard, and Merchant Marine.) 220 The regulations and practices of the three
institutions vary to some degree, owing at least in part to the differing missions
of the services. But all three receive their basic legal and operational form
through Department of Defense regulations, which implement the statutory au-
221thorization for the chaplaincies.
These regulations include two core requirements for the service chap-
laincies, which are reflected in the general structure of the chaplaincies and also
in the particular tasks assigned to individual chaplains. First, chaplains are
commissioned to provide religious services in accordance with the tenets of the
religious community that endorsed them for the chaplaincy.222 Second, of equal
significance, they also provide commanders with advice and assistance in meet-
ing the religious needs of all those for whom the commander has responsibility,
regardless of religious affiliations. 223 These two requirements-the particular-
218 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). See Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 197
Fed.Appx. 718 (9th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (upholding constitutionality of Section II of
RLUIPA).
219 AF POLICY DIR. 52-1, supra note 10; AR 165-1, supra note 10, at para. 1-4.c; SEC'Y OF
NAVY, U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, INSTR. 1730.7B, RELIGIOUS MINISTRY SUPPORT WITHIN THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY para. 4.b. (12 Oct. 2000) [hereinafter SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7B]
(Navy Chief of Chaplains as head of Chaplains Corps of the Navy).
220 SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7B, supra note 219, para. 6.
221 DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8; DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9; U.S. DEP'T DEFENSE,
DIR. 1300.17, ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES (03
Feb. 1988) [hereinafter DOD DiR. 1300.17].
222 AF POLICY Diw. 52-1, supra note 10, para. 3.4.2; AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4-4;
SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7B, supra note 219; OPNAV INSTR. 1730. ID, supra note 10, para. 5.b.(2).
223 DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8, para. 4; AF POLICY DIR. 52-1, supra note 10, para. 3.4.1;
AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4.5; OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1D, supra note 10, para. 5.b.(1).
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ism of a chaplain's ministry within a specific faith group, and the pluralism de-
manded by the obligation to assist all in need-are evident in the service of each
chaplain and provide the basic framework for understanding the chaplaincy.
In order to be eligible for service as a chaplain, candidates must meet
minimum educational qualifications (including a graduate degree), have experi-
ence in religious ministry and obtain an endorsement by a DOD-approved reli-
gious organization. 224 The endorsement certifies that the candidate is recog-
nized by that faith group as "fully qualified"-i.e., ordained, or its functional
equivalent-for professional ministry within that faith group.225 Both the en-
dorsing religious organization and the candidate must understand and accept the
chaplain's role within the "pluralistic environment" of the military, which in-
cludes the obligation to facilitate the free exercise of all who are served by the
chaplaincy. 6 If a religious organization subsequently withdraws its endorse-
ment for a chaplain, that chaplain ceases to be eligible for continued service and
must seek another endorsing organization, transfer to another (non-chaplain)
position within the military or leave the military altogether.227
Chaplains serve as commissioned officers.228 As noted earlier, their
primary obligations are to provide religious support, including worship and pas-
toral care, to eligible personnel, and to provide advice and assistance to com-
manders on religious and related matters, including assistance in facilitating the
religious exercise of all personnel. Chaplains may also be assigned a number of
other tasks, including supervision of other chaplains and religious facilities,
counseling of individuals and families, participation in official ceremonies, and
instruction in "the moral and ethical quality of leadership. 229 Chaplains are
specifically forbidden by the services to undertake responsibilities that would
directly involve them as combatants or in the exercise of military command.
The services provide significant and ongoing training for chaplains in a variety
of areas, ranging from the basic expectations of military service to more ad-
224 DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.1-4. See also Bindon, supra note 4, at 250 to 51
(on chaplaincy selection process).
225 DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.1.1.
226 Id. at para. 6.1.3. See also DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8, para. 4.2.
227 DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.5.
228 Id. at para. E2.1.2. (Defining "chaplain" as "[a] commissioned officer of the Chaplain Corps
of the Army, a commissioned officer of the Chaplain Corps of the Navy, or a commissioned offi-
cer in the Air Force designated for duty as a chaplain.").
229 See AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4-4 to 4-5; OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1D, supra note 10, para.
5.b.(2) to (5).
230 Prohibited activity includes service as a member of a court martial tribunal. See AR 165-1,
supra note 10, para. 4-3; OPNAV Instr. 1730.1D, supra note 10, para. 5.e.(11). The Geneva
Convention classifies chaplains as non-combatants, and chaplains enjoy the protections of that
status as long as they are "exclusively engaged in the work of their ministry." Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Part II: Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked, Section I -
General Protection, art. 8, Terminology, para. (d), June 8, 1977, 6 U.S.T. 3114.
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vanced study of clinical pastoral care, military ethics and comparative relig-
ions."'
Chaplains are eligible for promotion. As they increase in rank, the bal-
ance of their duties tends to shift away from the direct provision of religious
services and toward greater administrative responsibilities within the chap-
laincy.232 Upon reaching a specified age or time in grade without promotion,
chaplains are required to resign or retire from the service, though such a re-
quirement may be waived in special circumstances.233
As we noted earlier, the military has faced no direct and comprehensive
Establishment Clause challenge to the chaplaincy since the Katcoff decision, and
the result of any such lawsuit is highly unlikely to be any different now or in the
foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the legal justification for the chaplaincy should
be made clearer, not the least because the constitutionality of specific practices
within the chaplaincy will depend in large measure on the underlying legal justi-
fication for the institution as a whole. Consideration of the four criteria for the
constitutionality of religious accommodations, unpacked at the end of Part 1I,
234
facilitates the effort to better understand and defend the institution of the chap-
laincy.
A. Does the Chaplaincy Relieve a Government-Imposed Burden on Reli-
gious Exercise?
The court in Katcoff recognized that the legitimacy of the military chap-
235laincy rests on its response to the religious needs of service members. The
court focused exclusively on one aspect of the religious burden on service
members-isolation from their home religious communities when deployed
overseas or to remote domestic postings.236 If such isolation is the sole burden
to which the chaplaincy responds, then the appellate court in Katcoff was correct
231 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, paras. 8-6, 10-1 to 10-4 (chaplain training programs).
See generally DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAM. 165-3, RELIGIOUS AcTvrriEs: CHAPLAIN TRAINING
STRATEGY (01 Sept. 1988) [hereinafter AR PAM 165-3]. See also DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAM.165-
17, RELIGIOUS AcTrlvmEs: CHAPLAIN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT para. 4-1 to 4-13 (11 May 1998)
[hereinafter AR PAM 165-17].
232 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-05, RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN JOINT OPERATIONS 1-3 to 5
(09 June 2004) [hereinafter JP 1-05] (describing duties of chaplains with reference to rank). See
also AR PAM 165-17, supra note 231, para. 7-1 to 7-7.
233 See AR PAM 165-17, supra note 231, paras. 6-2 to 6-13, 7-7. See also Chaplaincy of Full
Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (describing Navy policy of
promotion and retention of chaplains).
234 See supra notes 201-18 and accompanying text.
235 Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234-35 (2d Cir. 1985).
236 Id. at 235-37. The isolation is caused both by remoteness and also by the requirements of
military order and security, which prevents civilians from having ready access to soldiers in de-
ployment. Id. at 236.
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in remanding the case for review of the scope of the chaplaincy.237 Even allow-
ing for an appropriate degree of deference to the military, the ministry of chap-
lains in many domestic settings would be rendered constitutionally vulnerable if
isolation of service members were its sole justification.
A richer understanding of the religious burden on service members,
however, would provide a firmer constitutional footing for the chaplaincy, as
well as a more accurate picture of the chaplaincy's significance. This burden of
military service has two related dimensions. First, the military-unlike virtually
all other professions-constitutes a distinct community, providing even in do-
mestic bases virtually all facets of ordinary life: from housing, schools, and
healthcare to shopping, recreation, and entertainment. 238 The exclusion of or-
ganized religion from that community would deprive service members and their
families of the ordinary opportunity enjoyed by civilians to have a religious
experience that is integrated into their normal lives. The military chaplaincy
responds to that burden by offering service members and their families the op-
portunity to participate in religious experience that is integrated with their
broader military communal life. In this sense, the chaplaincy is an equalizer,
giving religious experience the same presence in a military community as other,
secular aspects of life.
Second, the military presents service members with a range of stresses
and other experiences that are unique, especially those related to participation in
combat, which has become an ever-present reality for service members on ac-
tive duty and in the reserves. These stresses may have significant effects on
service members' religious beliefs, as well as their understandings of self and
relationships with others.239 Such stresses and the predictable moral, spiritual
and emotional reactions that follow constitute a real burden on service members,
and the government is constitutionally permitted to design a chaplaincy that
responds to such a burden.240 An adequate response to that burden includes
chaplains who understand and share the military experience of those to whom
they minister.24'
Taken together, these two dimensions of the religious burden of military
service suggest a broader latitude for accommodation than found in the Katcoff
237 Id. at 238.
238 HUTCHESON, supra note 238. See generally, U.S. Army, Welcome to the Army Family: A
First Guide for Army Spouses and Family Members, http://www.per.hqusareur.army.mil
/FRSA/docs/welcometothearmyfamily 1 .pdf.
239 Robert J. Phillips, The Military Chaplaincy of the 21st Century: Cui Bono? (unpublished
paper, originally presented at 2007 International Society for Military Ethics (copy on file with
authors and WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW)).
240 Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 31-33 (D.D.C. 2007).
241 The closest analogy on this point would be the chaplains of police and fire departments who
fill a similar role in those trauma-filled professions. See, e.g., Malyon v. Pierce County, 935 P.2d
1272 (Wash. 1997) (chaplaincy program in sheriff's department did not violate Establishment
Clause). But see Voswinkel v. City of Charlotte, 495 F. Supp. 588 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (police de-
partment chaplaincy violated Establishment Clause).
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analysis. The latitude remains bounded because not every facet of the chap-
laincy is likely to be reasonably characterized as a response to these burdens.
But the Katcoff challenge questioned the validity of the institution as a whole,
and questioned whether the existence of a professional military chaplaincy, fully
integrated into the life of units and the broader military community, represented
a reasonable response to burdens imposed on service members' free exercise.
The richer account of such burdens suggests that the institution may fairly be
described as responsive.
B. Does the Accommodation Facilitate Private and Voluntary Religious
Practice?
This criterion highlights an important difference between the military
chaplaincy and most other accommodations of religion. Other accommodations
create opportunities for private religious experience by relieving beneficiaries of
specific burdens, such as a work schedule that interferes with Sabbath obser-
vance, or a ban on wearing certain apparel that might be religiously mandated
for some people.242 As such, the accommodations typically work in the negative
by removing obstacles. In stark contrast, the military chaplaincy is a thoroughly
positive accommodation. The military may permit service members free time
for religious experience, but the chaplaincy also creates the content of such ex-
periences through preaching, worship, religious instruction and pastoral care.243
Accommodations that serve only to create time or physical space for religious
observance readily meet the requirement that such exercises must be private and
voluntary because the entity making the accommodation is detached from the
religious experience itself.
To meet its obligations under this second criterion, the military must
show that the religious experiences provided by chaplains are responsive to the
expressed religious preferences of service members. Such a showing may be
more difficult, or at least more complicated, than it appears because the chap-
laincy-like any institution-operates from its own inertia and the inclinations
and competences of its service providers, and not entirely from the articulated
desires of its "customers." Moreover, the chaplaincy certainly plays a role in
creating a demand for its services, and also in shaping which services are de-
manded. For example, a chaplain who socializes with troops may invite service
members to religious activities led by that chaplain. 244 The military responds to
242 Indeed, the military provides more traditional religious accommodations in the form of
exemptions from general regulations. See DOD DiR. 1300.17, supra note 221, para. 3.2.1, 3.2.6 to
3.2.7 (1988) (establishing policy on religious exemptions from work schedules and uniform re-
quirements). See also U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, NAVAL MILrrARY PERSONNEL MANUAL 1731-010, 2(a)
(01 Aug. 2006) [hereinafter OPNAV MANUAL 1731-010] (providing accommodation for day of
religious observance).
243 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4-4.a. & k. (describing duties of chaplains).
244 HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 71-74. See also Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 4, at 38-43
(discussing limits on religious speech by chaplains).
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this issue by providing that participation in all religious activities must be volun-
245al artoesetary. Commanders at all levels are required to ensure that service members
are not subjected to official pressure to attend religious services or otherwise
engage in religious activity. 246 Chaplains that provide non-religious services,
such as training in leadership and ethics, are prohibited from using such oppor-
tunities to engage in religious instruction, or even to urge service members to
participate in religious activities.247
The military's emphasis on voluntary participation by service members
in religious activities conforms to the requirement that accommodations must
respond to private religious needs. This conformity is even more evident in the
military's consistent message that the first duty of a chaplain is to facilitate the
free religious exercise of those who come within the chaplain's sphere of re-
sponsibility.248 The actual performance of religious services is a subordinated
obligation for the chaplain, one that arises in response to particular needs.249
However, the military chaplaincy is not uniformly responsive. It retains
elements that seem more to reflect government promotion, rather than accom-
modation, of religion. In part, this lack of uniformity may simply reflect an
incomplete transformation of a culture within the chaplaincy toward one that is
consistently focused on accommodation. 250 For example, a document from the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which describes the
Army's vision for chaplaincy within "Force XXI"-the 21st century Army-of-
fers the following account of the chaplain's role:
The Chaplaincy provides for the free exercise of religion for
soldiers, their family members, and authorized civilians in a
single seamless system. The UMT [unit ministry team] pro-
vides comprehensive RS [religious support] and presents the
245 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 3-2.a. ("Participation of Army personnel in reli-
gious services is strictly voluntary.").
246 Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding unconstitutional mandatory
chapel attendance policy at military academies). See also Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th
Cir. 2003) (holding unconstitutional practice of mandatory "supper prayer" at Virginia Military
Institute).
247 See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 165-16, MORAL LEADERSHIP/VALUES STAGES OF THE FAMILY
LIFE CYCLE, para. 1-2 (30 Oct. 1987) [hereinafter AR PAM 165-16] ("Chaplain instructors have a
responsibility to avoid any action, which would tend to confuse this training with religious in-
struction.").
248 DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8, para. 4.1. See Wildhack, supra note 4, at 229-32.
249 DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8, para. 4.2.
250 HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 82-83. See also ANNE C. LOVELAND, AMERICAN
EVANGELICALS AND THE U.S. MILITARY 1942-1993, 296-322 (1996).
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power of God in the lives of soldiers, families, and authorized
civilians.25'
The document continues with similar substantive theological claims
about the role of the chaplain.
The UMT represents the comfort and hope of religion and truth
in the high stress environment of military operations and fre-
quent deployments .... Our strength as an Army mirrors the
very soul of the nation. The Chaplaincy adds the dimension of
a loving and caring God to the environment in which soldiers
and Army families live and serve. 2
It is easy, of course, to exaggerate the significance of such statements,
especially in a document that is now a decade old. Nonetheless, the sentiments
conveyed in the TRADOC paper reflect an important, if subtle, tension with the
vision of the military chaplaincy as an instrument of religious accommodation.
Those sentiments profess, in the official words of the Army, specific theological
commitments-that God exists, is powerful, has a connection to the soul of
America and cares for and loves people. Such official religious professions
cannot be justified through the model of religious accommodations outlined
above.
The Air Force makes a similar claim in a document that is more recent
and more authoritative than the TRADOC paper. Air Force Instruction 52-1
describes chaplains as "visible reminders of the Holy," 253 although it immedi-
ately links that description with chaplains' duty to facilitate the free exercise of
religion by servicemembers. Compared to substantive religious claims found in
the TRADOC paper, in which God is asserted to be powerful and loving, the Air
Force Instruction suggests only a link between chaplains and "the Holy." None-
theless, the link represents a departure - if only the most innocuous - from the
military's responsive role, in which the military provides chaplains who receive
their religious endorsements from specific religious communities. Instead, the
Air Force assertion appears to warrant the religious authority of chaplains, and
indeed to warrant the reality of divine presence. Neither warrant is consistent
with the Establishment Clause limits on the practice of accommodation.2 4
251 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE PAM. 525-78, RELIGIOUS SUPPORT TO FORCE
XXI: U.S. ARMY CHAPLAIN UNIT MINIsTRY TEAMS para. 3-1a(1) (Sept. 1997).
252 Id. at para. 3-lb, 3-2a.
253 U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 52-101, CHAPLAIN PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION para. 2.1
(21 June 2002) [hereinafter AF INSTR. 52-1011.
254 Such an attitude seems to have been much more common prior to the Katcoff litigation. See
HuTCHESON, supra note 238, at 52 (service of religion to mission of military); Paul J. Weber, The
First Amendment and the Military Chaplaincy: The Process of Reform, 22 J. CHURCH & ST. 459,
464-66 (1980) (religious mission of the military accomplished through chaplaincy).
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A different challenge to the chaplaincy's responsive role arises from the
question of proselytizing by chaplains, a question left implicit in our earlier ex-
ample of the chaplain who invites service members to participate in religious
activities.255 The issue arises within a vacuum of regulation, and even of offi-
cial guidance, covering the chaplain's engagement with service members.
256
Some types and situations of proselytizing are clearly prohibited, such as those
that involve harassment or assertions of official authority (although chaplains do
not exert command authority, they are commissioned officers and are as such
entitled to official respect).257 Chaplains are also forbidden to use their conduct
of official non-religious services, such as morale support or leadership educa-
tion, as an opportunity for proselytizing. 258 Apart from such restrictions, chap-
lains may argue that proselytizing is an essential part of their ministry, and-as
long as performed in a non-coercive manner-is fully consistent with service
members' rights of free exercise.
Because existing regulations neither prohibit nor expressly permit such
proselytizing by chaplains, two essential questions about the constitutionality of
the practice need to be answered. First, does the Establishment Clause require
the government to prohibit non-coercive proselytizing by chaplains? Second,
does the Free Exercise Clause (or perhaps RFRA) grant to chaplains the right to
engage in proselytizing? The two questions are interdependent because an af-
firmative answer to either one would likely require a negative answer to the
other.
255 This question was raised most recently, and most publicly, in the controversy surrounding
religious conduct at the Air Force Academy. See generally Cook, supra note 4; Report of Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State on Religious Coercion and Endorsement of Relig-
ion at the United States Air Force Academy, http://www.au.org/pdf/050428AirForceReport.pdf;
Laurie Goodstein, Religious-Bias Inquiry is Set at Air Force Academy, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005,
at A29; Laurie Goodstein, Air Force Chaplain Tells of Academy Proselytizing, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 2005, at A 16. We do not address the equally-although differently-complicated question of
proselytizing by service members, but focus here exclusively on such conduct by chaplains. We
also defer for now the narrower question of a chaplain's conduct of pastoral care, which we take
up later as a distinct practice of the chaplaincy. See infra Part V.B.3.
256 The Air Force Chaplain School briefly distributed to its students a code of ethics for chap-
lains that was produced by the National Conference on Ministry to the Armed Forces (NCMAF),
an interfaith association that includes most of the religious bodies that endorse chaplains for the
armed services. The NCMAF ethics code states: "I will not proselytize from other religious bod-
ies, but I retain the right to evangelize those who are not affiliated." NCMAF, Covenant and
Code of Ethics for Chaplains of the Armed Forces, http://www.ncmaf.org/
policies/codeofethics.htm. The Air Force stopped distributing the code, and said that the code was
not an official statement of Air Force policy. Alan Cooperman, Air Force Withdraws Paper for
Chaplains: Document Permitted Proselytizing, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2005, at A3. Chaplain Cecil
Richardson-now the Air Force's deputy chief of chaplains-endorsed the statement from the
NCMAF ethics code in an interview with the New York Times. Laurie Goodstein, Evangelicals
are a Growing Force in the Military Chaplain Corps, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2005, at Al.
257 10 U.S.C. § 3581 (1956) ("A chaplain has rank without command."). See, e.g., AR 165-1,
supra note 10, para. 4-3.a.
258 See, e.g., AR PAM 165-16, supra note 247, para. 1-2.
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With respect to the Establishment Clause, the answer would turn on the
extent to which such proselytizing might reasonably be attributed to the gov-
ernment, acting through its agent the chaplain. Chaplains are entitled, and are
indeed required, to conduct worship services in accordance with the dictates of
their faith.259 The religious content of the worship services fits within the justi-
fication provided for a religious accommodation because service members
choose to participate. But where such choice is not present-or, as the chaplain
might say, not yet present-that justification is far less compelling. At best, the
government could argue that proselytizing represents nothing more than a chap-
lain informing service members of religious opportunities available to them.
This description is, of course, greatly weakened to the extent that the chaplain
suggests only one such opportunity, or at least the theological efficacy of only
one such opportunity.
What, then, of the chaplain's free exercise claim to engage in proselytiz-
ing?260 This interest is significantly weaker than the government's potential
Establishment Clause liability for proselytizing by chaplains. To begin with, the
chaplain's asserted right would be judged under the standard reflected in Gold-
man v. Weinberger,261 which suggested extraordinary deference to military au-
thority when service members assert free exercise claims.262 There is simply no
reason to treat chaplains differently from other service members for purposes of
applying the teachings of Goldman. Indeed, the chaplain entered the military
subject to an explicit understanding that the chaplaincy "function[s] in a plural-
istic environment," and is committed "to support directly and indirectly the free
exercise of religion by all" who are authorized to receive services.26 3 A court
would accord quite significant deference to a judgment by the military that
proselytizing may cause tension and divisiveness within the ranks, and may
interfere with the chaplain's primary obligation to facilitate the free religious
exercise of service members.
C. Is the Accommodation Available on a Denomination-Neutral Basis?
Compared to the second criterion, analysis of the third is relatively
straightforward. The chaplaincy is formally open to authorized clergy of all
faiths, subject to the requirement of having a DOD-recognized endorsing or-
ganization.2 4 Chaplains are required to facilitate all service members' free ex-
259 AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4-4.a. & e.; AF POLICY DIR. 52-1, supra note 10, para. 3.4.2;
OPNAV INSTR.1730.1 D, supra note 10, para. 5.e.(l).
260 See Rosen, supra note 4, at 1152-58.
261 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
262 Id. at 508; see also Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 26-28 (D.D.C. 2007) (discuss-
ing deferential standard drawn from Goldman).
263 DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.1.3.
264 The question of unlawful discrimination in DOD approval of endorsing organizations is
suggested by a recent dispute over a Wiccan chaplain. See Alan Cooperman, For Gods and Coun-
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ercise of religion.265 This includes direct services by military chaplains; ar-
rangements with civilian religious leaders or lay leaders if military chaplains are
not able to meet the needs of particular faith groups; and supportive services
coordinated by chaplains, including provision of space or materials needed for
religious activities.266 Although it is certainly possible, and perhaps likely, that
challenges will be brought because of the military's failure to make adequate
accommodations for a particular faith group, nothing in the overall structure of
the chaplaincy suggests that the institution is designed to promote certain
faiths.267
D. Does the Accommodation Impose Significant Burdens on Third Parties?
At first glance, assessment of this criterion would appear to proceed
along the same lines taken by the Supreme Court in Cutter, in its scrutiny of the
RLUIPA accommodation.268 Just as the Court in Cutter suggested deference to
prison authorities with respect to the costs of prison accommodation, courts are
likely to trust the military to protect the welfare of service members from expo-
sure to serious burdens that might result from the accommodation. But the
analogy to prison accommodations quickly breaks down because the chaplaincy
and RLUIPA's protections for "institutionalized persons" represent different
forms of accommodation. The harms resulting from the chaplaincy might not
be the same ones attaching to RLUIPA accommodations, which find their direct
parallel in the military's standard rules on accommodation of individual reli-
gious practices.269
The burdens of conventional accommodation of religious practice by
service members might include, for example, increased obligations to perform
certain kinds of tasks because a fellow unit member has a religious reason for
not performing them. There is no reason to believe that the military has cate-
gorically preferred the accommodation of religious beliefs to other relevant con-
siderations, such as familial needs, nor is there any reason to believe that a mis-
sion-oriented military would permit accommodations that generated third-party
burdens greatly disproportionate to benefits bestowed on the beneficiaries of
try: The Army Chaplain Who Wanted to Switch to Wicca? Transfer Denied, WASH. POST, Feb. 19,
2007, at C 1.
265 DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.1.3.
266 AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, para. 3.2; AR 165-1, supra note 10, paras. 4-5, 5-5;
OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1 D, supra note 10, para. 5.b.(2).
267 In Part V.A. infra, we discuss the related and heavily litigated question of religious prefer-
ences in the selection, promotion, and retention of chaplains.
268 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-25 (2005).
269 See generally DOD DIR. 1300.17, supra note 221 (implementing the statutory reaction to
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)).
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those accommodations. Accordingly, concerns present in Estate of Thornton270
are not likely to arise in the military context.
Instead, the burdens at issue in evaluating the chaplaincy would be
those that result from the affirmative operation of the chaplaincy itself. To the
extent that the chaplaincy functions as an optional feature of military life, the
burdens on third parties-non-participants-are likely to be no more than mi-
nor.271 If, however, the military tolerates or approves of more assertive interac-
tions between chaplains and service members, especially in contexts of particu-
lar vulnerability for the service members, then the harms might be seen as more
substantial. As in the case of RLUIPA's required accommodations of religious
practices in prison, the structure of the military chaplaincy does not suggest any
systematic burdens on third parties. Assertions of unconstitutional burdens on
third parties must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, rather than with respect
to the institution as a whole. Analyzed in light of its overall structure, the insti-
tution of the military chaplaincy is readily defensible as an accommodation of
religion. The military chaplaincy is capable of being conducted in a constitu-
tional manner, even if particular practices might be vulnerable to challenge. In
what follows, we explore several such practices and analyze the circumstances
in which the organization and operation of the chaplaincy might transgress con-
stitutional limits.
V. ACCOMMODATION NoRMS AS APPLIED TO PARTICULAR PRACTICES WITHIN
THE CHAPLAINCY
In Part V, we address two contexts within the military chaplaincy in
which significant constitutional issues have been raised. We first consider the
services' policies for accession, promotion, and retention of chaplains. We then
examine the services' regulation of particular aspects of chaplains' ministry,
including the conduct of worship, prayer at official functions, and the exercise
of pastoral care.
A. Employment of Chaplains
For more than a decade, a series of lawsuits in the federal courts of the
District of Columbia has addressed allegations of religious preferences in the
employment of Navy chaplains.272 Although the lawsuits involve a variety of
270 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). See supra Part 11I.B.4.
271 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 3-2a ("Participation of Army personnel in religious
services is strictly voluntary. However, Army personnel may be required to provide logistic sup-
port before, during, or after worship services or religious programs.").
272 Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re. Eng-
land, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); Larsen v. U.S. Navy,
486 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2007); Adair v. England, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006); see also
Wilkins v. U.S., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41268 (S.D. Cal. 2003). See generally, Ducoat, supra
note 4; Aden, supra note 4, Wildhack, supra note 4.
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claims, most focus on an alleged "Thirds" policy of the Navy to apportion slots
within the Chaplains Corps based on religious affiliation, with one-third each
going to Roman Catholics, "liturgical Protestants," and "non-liturgical Chris-
tians," with a small portion left for "Special Worship" (i.e., all other faith
groups).273 Such an apportionment, the lawsuits allege, is impermissible be-
cause it results in the significant over-representation of Roman Catholics and
"liturgical Protestants," and under-representation of those classified as "non-
liturgical Christians, ' '274 a group that includes most evangelical Christians. This
discrimination, the lawsuits allege, pervades the personnel policies of the Navy
Chaplains Corps, from accession and promotion through retention.27 5
Chaplaincy personnel policies must function within a complex constitu-
tional, statutory, and regulatory matrix. On the one hand, explicitly religion-
based employment policies of the government are ordinarily treated as constitu-
tionally suspect, typically requiring strict scrutiny when a matter of official pol-
icy. 276 On the other hand, the justification for a military chaplaincy rests on the
ability of chaplains to provide specific religious services to the military, so the
military has good reason to focus on the religious identity of chaplains. Recon-
ciling these two considerations-the default prohibition on religion-based em-
ployment discrimination, and the religion-conscious needs of the military chap-
laincy-represents a constitutional challenge.
One key to reconciliation appears in the standard trajectory of a military
chaplain's career. In the lower ranks, chaplains are more involved in the direct
provision of religious services, and proportionately less involved in administra-
277tive or other duties. As they progress up through the ranks, the proportions
shift, and more senior chaplains tend to lack direct responsibility for provision
of religious services. 278 Promotions, thus, should arguably be religion-neutral
because they should be used to evaluate and reward the chaplain's performance
of the broader, essentially secular role of facilitating the free exercise of those
within the chaplain's responsibility.
At the time of accession, the religious identity of a chaplain is most
likely to be relevant to the military's needs. Nevertheless, as revealed by recent
273 Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 294-95; Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 15-17.
274 A court described "non-liturgical Protestants" as follows: "'non-liturgical' denotes Christian
denominations or faith groups that do not have a formal liturgy or order in their worship service.
According to the plaintiffs, these groups baptize only adults or children who have reached 'the age
of reason' and their clergy do not usually wear vestments or special religious dress during ser-
vices. Referred to by some Navy chaplains as 'low church,' the non-liturgical Christian categories
include Baptist, Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Charismatic faith groups." Adair, 183 F. Supp. 2d at
36 (citations omitted). See also Aden, supra note 4, at 221-16.
275 Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 295-96.
276 Adair, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 46-50 (discussing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)).
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litigation over accession to the chaplaincy, 279 recruitment of new chaplains is
likely to be guided by a complex, service-specific calculus regarding the need to
accommodate the religious exercise of service members.
In Larsen v. U.S. Navy,28° the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia recently ruled in favor of the Navy in a case involving claims of reli-
gious discrimination in accession to a position as Navy chaplain. The plaintiffs
included three Protestant ministers who had complained that the Navy unlaw-
fully favored "liturgical" Protestant ministers over "non-liturgical" Protestant
ministers like themselves.28' "Non-liturgical" Protestant ministers are from de-
nominations that do not use a formal liturgy or order of worship, and generally
perform adult baptism rather than infant baptism.282
When the case began several years ago, the plaintiffs alleged that the
Navy followed the "Thirds" policy described above.283 This division into thirds
may (or may not) have once matched the demography of the U.S., but the com-
plaint alleged that the distribution did not come close to reflecting the religious
composition of the Navy by the 1990s.284 Thus, the "Thirds" policy resulted in
substantial over-representation of liturgical Protestants and substantial under-
representation of non-liturgical Protestants.
285
The Navy did not admit that it had ever utilized the "Thirds" policy.
Even if it had once utilized that policy, however, the district court found that it
had abandoned the policy, and any challenge to it was now moot. 286 Instead, by
the time the case came to be heard on cross-motions for summary judgment, the
Navy had switched to a denomination-neutral system for accession of chap-
lains.287 As the district court described the current policy, the Navy no longer
tries "to link the composition of the Navy Chaplaincy to the religious denomina-
tional demographics of the community generally., 288 Instead, the Navy now
279 Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2007).
280 Id.
281 Id. at 15.
282 Adair, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 36. See also Aden, supra note 4, at 213.
283 See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text. See also Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16.
284 Adair, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41 (describing religious demography of the Navy); Larsen, 486
F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 (alleging under-representation of non-liturgical Protestants).
285 Larson, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
286 Id. at 24-25. Had the Navy openly maintained the sort of denominational preference re-
flected in the "Thirds" policy, the question of the legitimacy of such a preference would have been
squarely presented. The plaintiffs had argued, citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), that
courts must strictly scrutinize any such explicit denominational preference. Id. at 28. Whether the
desire to match the religious demography of the chaplaincy with the religious demography of the
Navy itself would have satisfied such a strict standard of review is difficult to say. Once the de-
mography of the Navy changed in the direction of non-liturgical Protestants, however, there was
no remaining justification for the 'Thirds" beyond an illicit effort to maintain the existing distribu-
tion of power and authority in the Navy chaplaincy core.
287 Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 24-25.
288 Id. at 25.
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considers a variety of factors in determining its chaplaincy accession needs,
including:
"the breadth of locations where Navy personnel serve," "the
unique circumstances of Naval service, which involves person-
nel isolated on ships sailing all over the world," "the various
functions and tasks of chaplain officers outside of religious ser-
vices including assistance to those of other faith groups and
even no faith groups," "the need to keep accession, promotion,
and retention in line with other naval communities," "the need
to prevent shortages of qualified clergy," "the need to maintain
capacity to respond to events requiring quick access to chap-
lains from different faith groups not stationed on site, such as
terror attacks," and "the need to consider administrative neces-
sities in managing an all-volunteer corps.,
289
In light of the Navy's explicit move away from denominational con-
sciousness in selecting chaplains, the plaintiffs in Larsen shifted their theory of
the case.29° Instead of arguing that the Navy was engaging in unconstitutional
sectarian discrimination against non-liturgical Protestants, they argued that the
Navy was constitutionally obligated to take religious denomination of applicants
into account because that was the only way that the chaplaincy could be appro-
priately tailored to the free exercise needs of Navy personnel. 291 To put the
point slightly differently, the plaintiffs argued that the chaplaincy should be
denominationally proportionate to the religious demography of the Navy-if the
Navy as a whole was, for example, composed of one-half non-liturgical Protes-
tants, the Navy chaplaincy should be similarly constituted.
The district court rejected this claim. First, Judge Urbina concluded that
strict scrutiny was not the appropriate standard of review for the plaintiffs'
claim of religious discrimination against non-liturgical Protestant ministers.292
Instead, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated such discrimina-
tion under the Navy's current system for accession to the chaplaincy.293 The
court further rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the only justification for the
chaplaincy was the satisfaction of Navy personnel's constitutional rights of free
exercise, and that satisfaction of those rights required the Navy to tailor the
population of the chaplaincy to the religious demography of the Navy. Relying
289 Id. at 25-26 (quoting exhibits)
290 Id. at 30-33.
291 Id. at 30-31.
292 Id. at 26-27.
293 Id. at 28 ("[T]he plaintiffs own data shows that under the Navy's current accession policy,
accession rates among applicants of different faith groups have 'converged,' and any previously
existing statistical differences 'have dissipated."') (citations omitted).
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294heavily on Goldman v. Weinberger, Judge Urbina explicitly adopted the
model of permissive accommodation:
If, as is the case here, the Navy is permitted, but not constitu-
tionally required, to accommodate religious needs of its mem-
bers via a chaplaincy program, the Navy's program need not sat-
isfy every single service members' free exercise need, but need
only promote free exercise through its chaplaincy program. The
program is constitutionally sound if it simply works toward ac-
commodating those religious needs.295
Applying this concept of accommodation, coupled with Goldman-type
deference to military judgment, the district court ruled that the current structure
296of accession to the Navy chaplaincy is consistent with the Constitution. The
concept of permissive accommodation includes a zone of discretion, within
which the government may decide how best to reconcile potentially conflicting
objectives.297 The Navy's current approach was both acceptable and preferable
to the plaintiffs' suggestion of demographic proportionality for several reasons.
First, a policy of strict proportionality would inevitably mean that small reli-
gious minorities would have "no access to clergy of their faith."'2 98 Second, a
policy of strict proportionality does not adequately respond to worship varia-
tions among faiths and individuals; some groups and individuals require intense
and frequent interaction with worship experience, while others typically make
do with much less engagement with religion and its representatives. 299 Third, in
some instances, "clergy from one religious denomination are unable to cater to
the religious needs of a service member from a different religious denomina-
tion. 30 In contrast, other clergy are able to cross denominational lines more
easily. °1
The Navy's accession policy, the court found, permits the flexibility to
cope with these exigencies. 30 2 The Navy must "consider units or installations,
rather than individuals or broad statistical representation, as the primary crite-
294 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
295 Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (citing Arlin Adams, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the
Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 317 (1988)).
296 Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 33-34.
297 Id. at 31-32.
298 Id. at 35. The court offered the example of Muslims who represent less than .0027 of Navy
personnel. Proportional representation would lead to only 2 Muslim chaplains in the entire Navy;
instead, the Navy seeks to have at least 10 Muslim chaplains, "to ensure access to a chaplain of




302 Id. at 35-36.
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rion in being able to serve the cumulative total of individual requirements most
effectively. 3 °3 Once more invoking deference under Goldman, the court con-
cluded that perfect tailoring of the chaplaincy to the free exercise needs of indi-
vidual Navy personnel is probably impossible to achieve, and is not constitu-
tionally required.3°
The Larsen opinion is a bit of a funhouse mirror. The case did not in-
volve a conventional Establishment Clause challenge to the chaplaincy of the
sort litigated in Katcoff. Instead, the Larsen plaintiffs wanted to participate in a
chaplaincy, but they wanted it shaped in a way that would make it easier for
non-liturgical Protestant ministers to gain accession. Judge Urbina quite cor-
rectly perceived the problem; the plaintiffs wanted him to order the Navy to
remake its accession policy in the image they preferred.3 °5 To do so would be to
hold that there was only one constitutionally correct way to structure acces-
sion-that is, in line with the religious demography of the Navy. As Judge Ur-
bina noted, if he were to order such a restructuring, the Navy would inevitably
become deeply, and perhaps unconstitutionally, involved in studying "the reli-
gious habits and interests of its service members. ' 3°
At the most basic level, Judge Urbina's opinion proceeds from the
sound insight that the military chaplaincy is a matter of permissive, not manda-
tory, accommodation of religious need. No free exercise rights, of either chap-
lains or other service members, are at stake in its structure. Instead, the consti-
tution gives bounded discretion to all branches of the armed forces to fill the
personnel needs of the chaplaincy in ways that optimize the match between con-
siderations of religious experience and other considerations of military effi-
ciency. Whether or not the alleged "Thirds" policy fell within those boundaries,
Judge Urbina's decision to uphold the Navy's current policy against denomina-
tional preference, and against a concept of religious proportionality in accession,
seems constitutionally appropriate.30 7
B. Conduct of Ministry
Several aspects of chaplains' ministry have also come under constitu-
tional-and, in one case, quite political-scrutiny in recent years. We discuss
three in this section: the conduct of faith group worship, prayer at official cere-
monies, and the exercise of pastoral care.
303 Id. at 36 (citation omitted).
304 Id. See also id. at 32 ("[T]he Navy's arguments convince the Court in their own right that
stationing a chaplain wherever a service member needs one would be a logistical nightmare the
execution of which would significantly and perpetually strain military resources.").
305 Id. at 32-33, 35-36.
306 Id. at 35-36 (noting the potential entanglement problems associated with the plaintiffs'
preferred method of accession).
307 An appeal in Larsen is no doubt forthcoming.
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1. Faith Group Worship
Worship, for most faiths, is the heart of religious experience; it is the
center and source from which other obligations and practices radiate.30' The
United States Code appropriately gives the same shape to the military chap-
laincy. Regulations of the Department of Defense and the individual services
specify a wide range of duties for chaplains, but the statutes command only two
acts.3°  Chaplains must hold worship services and must conduct burial ser-
vices.310
The obligation to hold worship, however, concerns the type of activity
required rather than the content of that activity. The military allows chaplains to
determine the substance of worship services, including liturgy, hymns and ser-
mons.311 In delegating this responsibility to chaplains, the military responds to
two potential concerns. First, the military assures chaplains and their endorsing
bodies that chaplains will be free to lead worship "according to the manner and
forms of the church of which [the chaplain] is a member., 312 If chaplains con-
trol the content of worship services that they lead they will be able to avoid par-
ticipation in worship practices that are inconsistent with the demands of their
particular religious traditions. Second, the delegation reflects the dual "com-
mission" of chaplains. Although the military commissions chaplains to serve as
staff officers who are responsible for facilitating service members' free exercise,
the military does not give chaplains the authority to perform religious rites such
as administration of sacraments or conferral of blessings.31 3 That authority
308 See generally MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION
20-65 (Willard R. Trask trans, Harper & Row Publishing 1961) (1957) (religious life founded on
recognition of and entry into sacred space, as enacted in ritual).
309 AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, paras. 3 to 5 (Air Force chaplain duties); AR 165-1,
supra note 10, para 4.4 (Army chaplain duties); OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1D, supra note 10, para. 5.b.
(Navy chaplain duties).
310 10 U.S.C. § 8547(a) (2000) (Air Force); 10 U.S.C. § 3547(a) (2000) (Army); 10 U.S.C §
6031(a) (2000) (Navy).
311 See, e.g., AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, para. 3.2.2.2.:
Worship services may be designed by chaplains in response to a broad popula-
tion possessing common beliefs and desiring a specific style of worship. The
terms "liturgical," "traditional," "contemporary," "gospel" and "praise" are
exclusively used to identify chaplain-led worship of a particular style designed
to meet the needs inclusive of several denominations and/or a broad popula-
tion. Chaplain leadership ensures attentiveness to needs and sensitivity to the
diversity of those attending these worship services. Services must be adver-
tised and promoted by style, character, and doctrinal content.
This was not always the case. Anne Loveland describes the conflict over the "Unified Protestant
Sunday School Curriculum," adopted in the 1950s. LOVELAND, supra note 250, at 85-86, 90-94.
312 10 USC § 6031(a) (Navy). See also AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, at § 3.2.2.1; AR
165-1, supra note 10, para. 4.4.e.
313 HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 26.
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comes solely from the chaplain's religious body and the chaplain acts in the
name of that body, not in the name of the military, when leading worship.31 4
This delegation of responsibility for worship could create tension with
the underlying justification for the chaplaincy because the particular religious
commitments of chaplains might conflict with the military's broader goal of
accommodating service members' free exercise of religion. Two such conflicts
over worship have arisen in recent years-the first involving the concept of plu-
ralism and the second involving the practice of "collective Protestant worship."
a. The Varieties of Religious Pluralism
Department of Defense regulations require chaplains and endorsing
bodies to affirm that the ministry of chaplains takes place in a context of reli-
gious pluralism. 31 5 Army chaplain candidates are required to endorse the fol-
lowing statement:
While remaining faithful to my denominational beliefs and
practices, I understand that, as a chaplain, I must be sensitive to
religious pluralism and will provide for the free exercise of re-
ligion by military personnel, their families, and other authorized
personnel served by the Army.
3 16
This injunction to "sensitivity" provides little guidance on how chaplains should
relate their individual faith commitments, which might include beliefs about the
exclusive efficacy of their faith, to the religious beliefs of others, which the
chaplain might believe to be erroneous or even sinful.
The question of pluralism became concrete in a recent lawsuit, Veitch v.
England,317 which involved a former chaplain's claim of religious discrimina-
tion.318 The lawsuit was brought by Reverend Veitch, an ordained minister in
the Reformed Episcopal Church, who had served as a chaplain in the Navy.
319
Veitch alleged that his supervisor, Chaplain (Capt.) Buchmiller, who was a Ro-
man Catholic priest, was hostile to conservative and evangelical Protestants."'In particular, Veitch claimed that Buchmiller criticized the content of his ser-
314 Id. at 26, 29.
315 DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8, para. 4.2 ("Religious Organizations that choose to partici-
pate in the Chaplaincies ... express willingness for their Religious Ministry Professionals (RMPs)
to perform their professional duties as chaplains in cooperation with RMPs from other religious
traditions.").
316 Office of the Chief of Chaplains Form 13, "Statement of Understanding of Religious Plural-
ism in the U.S. Army" (copy on file with authors and WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW).
317 471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
318 Id. at 125-26.
319 Id. at 125.
320 Id. at 125-27.
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mons, and especially Veitch's preaching of "sola scriptura"-a doctrine of the
supremacy of scripture to all other sources of divine authority and guidance.3 1
Buchmiller said that his criticisms were directed toward Veitch's denigration of
other chaplains, including alleged references to them as "unregenerate," rather
than to Veitch's doctrinal preaching. 322 Buchmiller told Veitch "not 'to imply
that everyone else is wrong,' or that 'you are the only source of the truth with
implications that our other chaplains have no valid theology.'"
323
After a series of increasingly contentious exchanges, Veitch filed an
employment discrimination complaint.324 The investigating officer found that
Veitch had "engaged in non-pluralistic activity as evidenced by his sermons and
his statements to the inquiry officer., 325 The officer's report gave the following
definition of pluralism:
Pluralism is a well-established doctrine encompassing both
ethical... administrative... and practical standards... in the
USN Chaplain Corps. The basic tenant [sic] of pluralism has a
long history in the Chaplain Corps .... In laymen's terms the
Navy Chaplain must minister to all faiths in such a manner to be
inclusive... to all and unoffensive ... to all Navy personnel.326
Based on the investigating officer's report, the Navy dismissed Veitch's
claim. 327 When relations between Veitch and Buchmiller deteriorated further,
the Navy relieved Veitch of his pastoral duties and charged him with insubordi-
nation.328 Among other things, the charging officer's report stated that Veitch
"[w]as removed from [the] pulpit for failure to preach pluralism among relig-
ions. 3 29 Veitch resigned his commission in the Navy before his court martial
on the charges, although he later tried (unsuccessfully) to revoke his resigna-
tion.33°
In his lawsuit, Veitch alleged that his resignation had been coerced
through violations of the Establishment, Free Exercise and Speech Clauses of
321 Veitch v. England, No. 00-2982, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, *6-*9 (D.D.C.) (aff'd, 471
F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006). On the Reformation doctrine of "scripture alone," see MARTIN
LUTHER, SMALCALD ARTICLES, Art. 2, 1.15, in THE BOOK OF CONCORD: THE CONFESSIONS OF THE
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH 295, 304 (Robert Kolb & Timothy J. Wengert eds., Charles
Arand trans et.al. (2000)).
322 Id. at *6-*7, *31-32.
323 Id. at *8 (quoting an e-mail from Buchmiller to Veitch, Nov. 13 1998).
324 Id. at *9.
325 Id. at *10.
326 Id.
327 Id. at * 16.
328 Id. at *17-*20.
329 Id. at *19.
330 Id. at *21.
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the Constitution, as well as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and
other statutory protections. 33' At bottom, Veitch argued that the "pluralism"
enforced by his Navy superiors represented an unconstitutional "establishment
of religion," and that the Navy's sanctions against him for failing to comply
with this official orthodoxy violated his rights to practice his religious beliefs
"according to the manner and forms" of the religious body that endorsed his
ministry.
33 2
The district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
avoided, on slightly different grounds, what they acknowledged to be the diffi-
cult set of constitutional questions raised by Veitch's claim of mandatory plural-
ism. 333 The courts determined that the Navy did not coerce Veitch's resignation,
and therefore he had suffered no personal injury from the Navy's policy on reli-
gious pluralism.
334
The court in Veitch may have avoided the difficult constitutional ques-
tions, but the issues are likely to return. From the facts in the case, the Navy's
policy of religious pluralism can be assigned a range of possible meanings, each
with slightly different constitutional implications. We describe the outer
boundaries of this range as "maximal" and "minimal" pluralism.
i. Maximal Pluralism
This most robust understanding of pluralism seems to be reflected in the
charging officer's finding that Veitch "was removed for failure to preach plural-
ism among religions. 335 Although the officer did not elaborate on the duty to
"preach pluralism among religions," it might be taken as a theological truth
claim, asserting the equal validity of all faith commitments.336 This truth claim
of maximal pluralism could be a subtle form of universalism, such as that cap-
tured by the sentiment that "we are all on different paths with the same destina-
tion. 337 Alternatively, maximal pluralism might rest on a more relativistic as-
sertion that all faith traditions rest on equally unverifiable, subjectivist beliefs.33 8
331 Id. at *1-*2.
332 Id. See also Aden, supra note 4, at 225-229.
333 Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *48-*53 (ruling that Veitch lacked standing to raise
the constitutional claim); Veitch, 471 F.3d at 131-32 (ruling that the Navy acted reasonably in
denying Veitch's request to withdraw his resignation).
334 Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *26-*53; Veitch, 471 F.3d at 127-32.
335 Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *19.
336 See generally Paul Otterstein, Theological Pluralism in the Air Force Chaplaincy, MIL.
CHAPLAINS REV. 89 (Fall 1987).
337 Id. at 110-11 (discussing JOHN HICK, GOD HAS MANY NAMES (1980)). See also GEORGE A.
LINDBECK, THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION AND THEOLOGY IN A POSTLIBERAL AGE 22-23,
52-53 (Westminster Press 1984) (discussing universalist implications of expressive-experientialist
models of faith).
338 Id. at 109. This form of pluralism is better characterized as religious relativism in that it
recognizes essential differences between faiths, but denies that any one faith is-or could
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In both its universalist or relativist modes, however, maximal pluralism repre-
sents a substantive and highly contested set of religious commitments.
39
Officially compelled proclamation of these religious commitments
would raise serious problems under both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. 34° The establishment questions return us to the framework of accom-
modation, which provides the warrant for government-sponsored religious activ-
ity.34' Viewed in that light, the chief issue raised by the concept of maximal
pluralism is whether the affirmative obligation to preach a specific religious
message responds to a government-imposed burden on free exercise. The iden-
tity of any such burden escapes our imagination. Instead, the Navy's purported
duty to "preach pluralism" would likely arise from just the sort of problem un-
derlying the Veitch lawsuit-religious conflict among chaplains and service
members exacerbated by inflammatory preaching. The mandate of preaching
pluralism, then, would turn the religious message into an instrument of military
policy. While the goal may be laudable, the intentional, governmental promo-
tion of specific religious messages to further policy goals violates a core com-
ponent of the non-establishment guarantee. In promoting specific religious doc-
trines, the government has essentially proclaimed itself competent to judge the
religious superiority of such doctrines. 4  Regardless of the secular efficacy of
the doctrines, this course of action is a violation of government's constitutional
obligation of neutrality among religions, as well as its jurisdictional limitation to
temporal matters.343
An affirmative duty to "preach pluralism" would also be seriously vul-
nerable to free exercise or free speech challenges by chaplains. The strength of
these claims, however, depends on a closer examination of the peculiar role held
by military chaplains. Apart from that role, the First Amendment would un-
doubtedly prohibit the government from requiring religious leaders to profess a
specific doctrine.?" In addition to the Establishment Clause objections dis-
be-superior to another. WILLIAM R. HUTCHISON, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN AMERICA: THE
CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF A FOUNDING IDEAL 233-240 (Yale University Press 2003); LINDBECK,
supra note 337, at 48-49 (on possible incommensurability of religious languages).
339 See generally LINDBECK, supra note 337, at 1-26.
340 The free exercise problems would implicate speech clause concerns about compelled speech
as well. See generally Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006).
341 See supra notes 201-18 and accompanying text (describing the general framework for as-
sessing religious accommodations).
342 Madison's Memorial & Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted with ap-
proval by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), specifically criticizes
any government policy which makes "the Civil Magistrate ... a competent Judge of Religious
truth," because such a policy "is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of
Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world ..... Id. at 41 n.31, 67.
343 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitu-
tional Order, 47 VILL. L. REv. 37, 83-84 (2002).
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cussed above, the requirement would also constitute "compelled speech," which
is tested against a very strict constitutional standard. 3 To justify such compul-
sion, the government must show that its speech requirement is the least restric-
tive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. 346 While the avoid-
ance of interreligious conflict within military units might well be considered a
compelling government interest, especially in light of courts' traditional defer-
ence to military judgments in such matters, the mandatory preaching of religious
pluralism is unlikely to be accepted as the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest. Military officials have many other and less intrusive means of
addressing religious conflict short of mandating proclamation of specific reli-
gious messages.347 Unless all those means were shown to be unavailing, courts
would be very unlikely to uphold the practice.
The religious speech of military chaplains, however, is not identical to
the religious speech of private persons because chaplains conduct worship in the
course of their official military duties. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,348 the Supreme
Court recently held that a government employee does not enjoy First Amend-
ment protections when the speech in question is directly job-related. 349 Garcetti
suggests that the speech of chaplains, even in worship, might be construed as
expression by the government rather than private expression.350 If that view
holds, the problem of compelled speech disappears. Whatever the authority of
government to compel private parties to speak, the First Amendment is no bar to
the government ordering its own agents to deliver particular messages.
Even if Garcetti undermines the free speech objection to compelling
chaplains to preach a message of religious pluralism, however, chaplains have
other potential objections to such compulsion. First, the government assures
chaplains and their endorsing agencies that, in the words of the Army regula-
tion, "[c]haplains will not be required to take part in worship when such partici-
pation is at variance with the tenets of their faith. 351 If a chaplain's religious
commitments conflict with proclamation of the message of robust religious plu-
345 See generally Alexander, supra note 340.
346 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715-17.
347 Such means could include, for example, mandatory training of all personnel in inter-
religious sensitivity, or rigorous enforcement of norms against religious discrimination.
348 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
" id. at 1960-62.
350 Id. at 1960 ("Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citi-
zen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commis-
sioned or created."). We recognize the limits and complexity of this claim. Unlike the govern-
ment lawyer at issue in Garcetti, military chaplains engage in religious expression on behalf of
specific individuals who voluntarily attend the chaplains' services. In this respect, the govern-
ment's actual interest in the expression of chaplains is less direct than its interest in the expression
of lawyers who represent the government-the expression of chaplains serves the needs of the
government to the extent that it responds to the religious needs of service members.
351 AR 165-1, supra note 10, at para. 4.4.e.
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ralism, the military would seem bound to respect its original promise-although
that might result only in the chaplain's excused absence from preaching or lead-
ing worship.
Second, and more importantly, the religious content of faith group wor-
ship renders such speech fundamentally different from ordinary acts of govern-
ment employees' job-related expression. One district court decision, Rigdon v.
Perry,352 takes a broad view of this distinction between the speech of chaplains
and that of other government employees. 353 In Rigdon, military chaplains chal-
lenged a ruling that prohibited them from urging chapel parishioners to lobby
members of Congress about pending antiabortion legislation.354 The court held
that the religious speech of chaplains, delivered to congregants, does not repre-
sent the use of official authority to engage in partisan political authority be-
cause, in that context, chaplains do not speak in any "official" capacity. 355 Us-
ing the same standard that would be applied to content-based regulation of pri-
vate speech, the court ruled that the restrictions at issue were not the least re-
strictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest and invalidated
the restrictive ruling.356
Despite the language in Rigdon, the decision does not stand for the
proposition that the speech of chaplains in faith group worship is equivalent, for
purposes of constitutional analysis, to private religious speech.357 Instead, the
decision interprets specific restrictions on the content of official speech and
finds that the policies underlying the restrictions- do not apply to the religious
speech of chaplains in the context of faith group worship. The policies at issue
involved concerns about undue influence by military superiors and the public
perception of a politicized military. 358 The court ruled that chaplains do not
exercise military command authority, and thus do not present the risk of undue
influence that justified the regulation.359 The court also dismissed the military's
concerns about the political involvement of chaplains, finding that the services
352 962 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1997).
353 Id. at 159 ("While military chaplains may be employed by the military to perform religious
duties, it does not follow that every word they utter bears the imprimatur of official military au-
thority ...."). It is important to note, however, that the military has significantly amended the
regulations on which the Rigdon court relied for this argument. Compare the regulations cited id.
at 159, with current versions of AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4.3 to 4.4 (eliminating reference to
the representative role of chaplains).
354 Rigdon, 962 F. Supp. at 159.
355 Id. at 159-160.
356 Id. at 161-62.
357 Indeed, in Veitch, the D.C. Circuit panel expressly questioned Rigdon's conclusion about
the official status of chaplains. 475 F.3d at 130 (distinguishing "Rigdon, even if correctly decided
(which we doubt) ... ").
358 Rigdon, 962 F. Supp. at 156-159.
359 Id. at 160.
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regularly tolerate more robust political expression than the chaplains' conduct at
issue in the case.36 °
A chaplain's speech in faith group worship, then, falls in a unique neth-
erworld between a government employee's job-related speech (restrictable un-
der Garcetti) and the expression of a private individual (protected against com-
pulsion by Wooley and Barnette). As such, the military may well have a degree
of latitude in restricting the content of chaplains' religious speech-even in faith
group worship-but the restrictions will need to relate specifically to the chap-
lain's government-sponsored role. In other words, the chaplain acts as an agent
of the government even in the course of faith group worship, but the agency
relationship is limited to the purpose of accommodating service members' free
exercise of religion.361 If the chaplain's religious speech undermines or other-
wise departs from that purpose, the military should be able to take remedial ac-
tion without needing to satisfy the strict scrutiny applied in Wooley or even
Rigdon.
Seen in light of that modified speech inquiry, the requirement to
"preach religious pluralism" represents a closer case than the restrictions on
political activity in Rigdon v. Perry. Chaplains may not exercise the type of
command that invites concerns about undue influence, but chaplains are respon-
sible for facilitating all service members' access to religious experience, and the
military may appropriately conclude that such responsibility requires an attitude
of equal respect for all faiths, manifest in all of the chaplain's activities.
Whether or not a chaplain's statutory or constitutional rights preclude
the military from ordering him or her to lead worship in a particular, pluralistic
way, we think that the Establishment Clause forbids the proclamation of an offi-
cial theology of the armed forces, whether it be Christianity, religious pluralism
or a crude claim that God supports the military policies of the United States. If
we are correct about this, courts would not have to reach the questions of a
chaplain's rights under any other source to enjoin the imposition of a duty to
preach such an official theology.
ii. Minimal Pluralism
If the context of preaching in faith group worship represents the maxi-
mal claim of required pluralism, the minimal claim involves what might better
be called an attitude of "pragmatic pluralism," manifest in aspects of the chap-
lain's role outside of faith group worship. Unlike the maximal version, the
minimal obligation does not require affirmative assent to or expression of theo-
logical truth claims. Instead, the minimal obligation focuses on the chaplain's
performance of specific acts, such as the maintenance of working relationships
with fellow chaplains, and the chaplain's diligence in facilitating all service
360 Id. at 162.
361 Contrast with Rigdon, in which the court suggests that speech of chaplain in worship should
be characterized as private speech within a limited public forum. Id. at 162-65.
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members' religious needs on an equal basis. This minimal or pragmatic under-
standing of pluralism was also manifest in Veitch v. England because the mili-
tary alleged that Veitch denigrated other chaplains and other faiths even outside
of faith group worship, and failed to cooperate in projects of shared ministry.362
In stark contrast to the constitutional vulnerability of maximal plural-
ism, the pragmatic version rests on a solid constitutional foundation. As noted
earlier, chaplains and their endorsing bodies affirm that military chaplaincy
takes place in a religiously pluralistic environment, and that chaplains are ex-
pected to respect and further the free exercise interests of all service members
without regard to specific religious commitments.363 A chaplain that denigrates
other faiths and undermines the ministry of fellow chaplains acts in direct con-
tradiction to the basic justification for the chaplaincy itself. In requiring chap-
lains to practice "pragmatic pluralism," the military does not establish a particu-
lar version of religious truth, but instead directs its officers to perform the le-
gitimate secular work of accommodating religion.
Free exercise or speech claims by chaplains challenging pragmatic plu-
ralism would be similarly weak, at least outside the context of faith group wor-
ship. Although we questioned the application of Garcetti to faith group wor-
ship, the reasoning adopted by the Court should apply without reservation to the
official conduct of chaplains outside of such worship.36 When chaplains en-
gage in professional activities outside of worship and related religious activities
such as instruction and counseling, their role as agents of the military takes
precedence over those aspects of the role more properly seen as a delegation
from their religious bodies. In these broader professional activities, the job-
related speech of chaplains should be under the same strict controls as job-
related speech of other military officers.
A chaplain might assert that RFRA, which prohibits the federal gov-
ernment from substantially burdening religious exercise unless the burden is
necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental interest, protects his or her
right to resist the dictates of minimal pluralism and its corollary of equal reli-
gious respect for all service members. 365 RFRA-based arguments by chaplains
would fail, however, for want of a substantial burden, or on the strength of the
government's interest in avoiding disharmony among service members. 366 A
362 Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *36-*38.
363 DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.1.3.
364 See supra notes 348-61 and accompanying text.
365 Indeed, this is the best way to interpret Veitch's underlying claim in his lawsuit-a claim
that did not need to be reached because of his resignation from the Navy. Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6257, at *49-*50.
366 This assumes, of course, that a court would apply RFRA's ordinary standards to a case
involving the military. But there is every reason to believe that the more lenient standard of
Goldman v. Weinberger, which provides great deference to military judgments, would govern
application of RFRA in the military context because RFRA is designed to restore religious liberty
to its pre-Smith status, and that status includes Goldman deference. See Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486
F. Supp. 2d 11, 25-30 (D.D.C. 2007).
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chaplain who originally agrees to work within a religiously pluralist environ-
ment is not likely to receive a sympathetic hearing if the chaplain later asserts
that conscientious performance of religious duties requires active denigration of
other chaplains or faiths. The voluntary acceptance of the role undercuts the
idea that the limits imposed on the chaplaincy constitute a "substantial burden"
on the religious freedom of its occupants.367
Even if a court agreed that a mandatory practice of pragmatic pluralism
constitutes a substantial burden on the chaplain's religious exercise, the court
would certainly find that the government has a compelling interest in prohibiting
religious disparagement by those commissioned to facilitate religious practices
of all service members. Such disparagement could reasonably be seen as a
threat to the cohesion of military units, and also as an obstacle to service mem-
bers' access to religious services, especially if the chaplain's disrespectful atti-
tude leads service members to avoid seeking his or her assistance, or the assis-
tance of other chaplains. Unlike the concerns at issue in Rigdon, these threats
are concrete, significant and closely related to the restrictions imposed on chap-
lains' expression.368
iii. Pragmatic Pluralism in the Context of Faith
Group Worship
The most difficult and interesting questions arise in the context of faith
group religious activities and involve express or implied denigrations of other
faiths. If the military may not require chaplains to embrace religious pluralism
as a theological truth claim, may the military nonetheless prohibit chaplains
from disparaging other faiths in the course of faith group worship or instruction?
This issue is most likely the one that would have been litigated had Veitch been
granted standing to bring his constitutional challenges. 369 Although the investi-
gating and charging officers (who were line officers, not chaplains) asserted the
more robust form of pluralism, Veitch's chaplain supervisor seemed to assert a
more modest form.37° In response to Veitch's claim that he was being disci-
plined for preaching the doctrine of sola scriptura, the supervisor, Buchmiller,
said, "I had no problem with Sola Scriptura as long as he was not being divisive
and destroying the reputation of the other chaplains. 371
367 See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925-26 (Cal. 1996)
(obligation to rent on equal terms to unmarried couples imposed no substantial burden on land-
lord's free exercise because landlord's religion did not compel her to provide rental housing, and
she was free to withdraw from the rental housing market and invest her resources elsewhere).
368 Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150, 162 (D.D.C. 1997) (chaplains' speech about the morality
of pending abortion legislation does not present a credible threat to the "loyalty, discipline, or
morale of [the] troops").
369 Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *4-*6.
370 Id. at *6-*7.
371 Id. at *7.
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Buchmiller's response demonstrates the challenge of enforcing prag-
matic pluralism in the worship setting. Veitch asserted that his faith required
the preaching of "scripture alone," but the doctrine-a core commitment of the
Protestant Reformation-necessarily implies the error of other faith traditions,
most specifically that of Roman Catholicism, which recognizes a broader
ground of religious authority.7  Thus, the complaint that Veitch's preaching
was "anti-priest" likely reflects the chaplain's rejection of religious authority as
mediated by the church, a proclamation wholly bound up with another core con-
viction of the Reformation, sola gratia ("by grace alone"), which also rejects the
mediation of ecclesial authority.373
The Protestant-Roman Catholic division reflected in Veitch is hardly
anomalous. Most faith traditions define themselves, at least in part, through a
denial of other beliefs. From the Shahadah said by Muslims to the Shema of
Jews to the Athanasian Creed (Quicumque vult) of Christians, confessions ex-
plicitly or implicitly commit adherents to disavow other faiths.374 Of course, the
manner in which a chaplain preaches or teaches the exclusivist message is likely
to be the trigger for military regulation or discipline, not the mere fact that the
chaplain has asserted the exclusive efficacy of one faith tradition. For example,
the military might not attempt to regulate the recitation of creeds, liturgy or
scripture verses that contain exclusivist claims, but might have a different atti-
tude toward chaplains that overtly and specifically condemn the faith traditions
of others. A particularly vivid example of the latter would be Martin Luther's
depiction of the Roman Catholic Church, and especially the office of the pa-
pacy, as the "Whore of Babylon. 375
Was Chaplain Buchmiller on solid constitutional ground when he ad-
monished Veitch not to preach exclusivist doctrine in a manner that was "divi-
sive" and "destroy[ed] the reputation of other chaplains"?3 76 We described
above the proper framework for judicial review of such a question.377 While
leading faith group worship, the chaplain is simultaneously an agent of an en-
dorsing organization-and thus a private individual-and an officer of the gov-
ernment. Although the specific religious acts in worship are not attributable to
372 JAROSLAV PELIKAN, 4 THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION: REFORMATION OF CHURCH AND DOGMA
(1300-1700) 167-82 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1983).
373 Id. at 138-55.
374 JAROSLAV PELIKAN, CREDO: HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL GUIDE TO CREEDS AND
CONFESSIONS OF FAITH IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION 186-215 (Yale Univ. Press 2003) (on creedal
anathemas). See also id. at 330-35 (on the Shema of the book of Deuteronomy); OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 286 (John L. Esposito ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (on the Shehadah of
Islam).
375 JAMES M. KrrrELSON, LUTHER THE REFORMER: THE STORY OF THE MAN AND HIS CAREER
276-77 (Fortress Press 2003); BERNARD LOHSE, MARTIN LUTHER: AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE
AND WORK 88-89 (Robert C. Schultz trans., Fortress Press 1986).
376 Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *7.
377 See supra notes 341-61 and accompanying text.
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the government, the government nonetheless retains an important interest in
how the chaplain's role is conducted. In other words, the chaplain remains an
instrument of government policy even in the act of leading faith group worship.
The policy, broadly stated, is the government's purpose of accommodating ser-
vice members' religious exercise in a way that does not cause destructive dis-
harmony within the service.378 The government, acting through military superi-
ors, may regulate all facets of the chaplain's performance in order to ensure that
the chaplain is meeting the religious needs of service members, and doing so
within the religiously pluralist environment of the military.
Thus, Veitch's supervisor would have two independent grounds for ad-
monishing the chaplain for his divisive proclamation of exclusivist doctrines.
First, the military has an interest in ensuring that the religious convictions of all
service members are accorded equal respect; pastoral injunctions to denigrate
the beliefs of others may create an atmosphere of religious intolerance. Second,
the military has an interest in maintaining "individual and unit readiness, health
and safety, discipline, morale, and cohesion., 379 Divisive preaching and reli-
gious instruction may pose a legitimate threat to unit morale and cohesion, espe-
cially if the religious claims relate to the moral character and trustworthiness of
non-adherent fellow service members.
To justify regulation of a chaplain's conduct in faith group worship, the
military would need to show that the specific manner of proclamation, and not
merely the content of the doctrine, materially harmed or threatened the mili-
tary's interests. Such regulation would not present the establishment clause
problems noted in connection with maximal pluralism because the military
would not be requiring chaplains to preach a specific doctrine, or even forbid-
ding proclamation of a faith tradition's exclusivist confession. Instead, the mili-
tary would only specify that proclamations must not specifically denigrate the
religious beliefs of others.380
Free exercise or free speech claims by chaplains opposed to such re-
striction likely would be resolved on the question of the government's interest in
regulating the speech, and on the specific means used to further that interest. In
this respect, the traditional concerns about mechanisms for regulating speech,
such as the clarity of the restriction, the extent of discretion accorded to officials
charged with regulating the speech and opportunities for prompt review of offi-
378 Seen in this light, the chaplaincy falls under the military's general policy for accommoda-
tion, as reflected in DOD Din. 1300.17, supra note 221. This directive limits any accommoda-
tions that would "have an adverse impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, standards, or disci-
pline." Id. at para. 3.1. In Larsen v. U.S. Navy, the court emphasized the chaplain's role as an
instrument of the government's permissive accommodation of service members' religious needs -
a role that circumscribes the chaplain's assertion of his or her own rights to religious liberty in the
exercise of that office. 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2007).
379 DOD DIR. 1300.17, supra note 221, para. 4.1.1.
380 For a vigorous defense of the idea that the Establishment Clause forbids government-
sponsored denigration of anyone's religious beliefs, see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE
G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 124-128 (Harvard Univ. Press 2007).
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cials' decisions, would all be important. Those concerns, however, are more
likely to involve the manner in which the military implemented the restriction,
rather than the possibility that some type of restriction could withstand substan-
tive constitutional scrutiny. Buchmiller may well have stood on solid ground in
his admonitions to Veitch.
b. Collective Protestant Worship
The practice of faith group worship raises a very different set of consti-
tutional questions in the context of a common practice, the "Collective Protes-
tant" worship service.381 Because of the broad array of Protestant denomina-
tions, it is sometimes impossible-and frequently inefficient-to plan regular
chapel worship for a single Protestant denomination, or to prepare for distinctive
rites such as baptism or confirmation.382 Instead, chapel programs typically
offer a "Collective Protestant" worship service in which a chaplain from one
denomination leads worship for congregants representing a broad array of tradi-
tions.383 It is possible, and perhaps even likely for chaplains coming from
smaller denominations, that none of the congregants would be from the chap-
lain's faith group.
The constitutional issues surrounding Collective Protestant worship all
stem from the one distinctive feature of the practice: there is no religious body
called "Collective Protestantism," so the military chaplaincy creates a religious
community, and in the process decides on the hymnody and liturgy of this mili-
tary religious community.384 This contrasts sharply with Roman Catholic wor-
ship, and to a somewhat lesser degree with Jewish and Orthodox Christian wor-
ship, all of which involve forms and content of worship that are proscribed by
tradition or ecclesial authority outside the military.385 In our earlier discussion
of the chaplain's role in leading worship we focused on the extent to which the
chaplain derived religious authority from an endorsing body, not from the gov-
ernment. When the military determines, however, that worship should be con-
ducted in a way that includes a wide range of Protestant denominations, the in-
stitutional responsibility for the worship might reasonably be thought to shift
from the chaplain's endorsing body to the military chaplaincy itself. Such a
381 HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 86-87; Kenneth W. Bush, Military Worship Wars: Blended
Worship as a Pastoral Response, THE ARMY CHAPLAINCY (Winter-Spring 2003),
http://www.usachcs.army.mil/TACarchive/ACwinspr03/bush.htm; S. David Chambers, The Prot-
estant Problem, MILITARY CHAPLAINS REvIEw 81, 84-85 (Fall 1987); Wildhack, supra note 4, at
234-35.
382 Different faith groups may gather separately and regularly for special occasions. Chambers,
supra note 381, at 83-84.
383 HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 87.
384 Chambers, supra note 381, at 84-85.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss1/10
INSTRUMENTS OF ACCOMMODATION
shift would render the chaplaincy more vulnerable to establishment clause chal-
lenge because it suggests that the government has become the author of reli-
gious experience, rather than simply the provider of opportunities for religious
experiences authored or directed by others.
Although the concern is theoretically reasonable, the actual practice of
Collective Protestant worship suggests that the concern is misplaced, or at least
overstated. Chaplains themselves determine the form of worship that a particu-
lar Collective Protestant worship service will use.386 The military does not spec-
ify an order of worship, liturgy or set of hymns, although the chaplaincy pub-
lishes worship materials with options that chaplains may select.387 Chaplains
may adopt materials exclusively from their own tradition, but they generally
select worship styles that will appeal to congregants from a wide array of de-
nominations.388 As Hutcheson notes, "The fact that most Protestant chaplains
do make such adjustments is not an indictment but an indication of their desire
to minister effectively. ' '389 He goes on to suggest that the Collective Protestant
worship services reflects the present widespread permeability between Protes-
tant denominations in the broader society, along with the growing number and
size of non-denominational Protestant congregations.390 The significant diver-
sity of worship styles even within a single Protestant denomination reinforce
Hutcheson's sense that the Collective Protestant worship experience mirrors the
existing shape of American Protestant worship.391
The practice is somewhat complicated when the Collective Protestant
worship service involves multiple chaplains, with a superior making the final
judgment about particular elements of the worship. Those disagreements might
include preferences for greater or less formality in worship, the use of traditional
hymns and musical accompaniment or contemporary songs and instrumentation,
the frequency and practice of administration of sacraments, or a wide variety of
other aspects of worship.392 Such a "command decision" on the content of Col-
lective Protestant worship, however, does not indicate an official establishment
of "Collective Protestantism." Instead, it demonstrates just one among many
local and shifting settlements about how the worship should be conducted, ar-
rangements that will shift further when existing chaplains depart and new chap-
386 Bush, supra note 381; Chambers, supra note 381, at 84-85, 88.
387 ARMED FORCES CHAPLAINCY BOARD, BOOK OF WORSHIP FOR UNITED STATES FORCES 574-90
(1974) (different versions of "Order of Worship, Protestant").
388 Bush, supra note 381 (on homogenizing pressures within "General Protestant Worship");
Chambers, supra note 381, at 85-86 (tradition of appeal to broad consensus within Protestantism
may have fractured).
389 HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 86.
390 Id.
391 See generally JAMES F. WHITE, PROTESTANT WORSHIP: TRADITIONS IN TRANSITION (West-
minster John Knox Press 2006); RONALD P. BYARS, THE FUTURE OF PROTESTANT WORSHIP:
BEYOND THE WORSHIP WARS (Westminster John Knox Press 2002).
392 Wildhack, supra note 4, at 221.
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lains arrive. These shifting practices should be driven primarily by an assess-
ment of the needs of the worshiping community, although the chaplain will in-
evitably interpret those needs through the prism of the chaplain's own religious
experience and faith tradition.393 Seen in this light, the Collective Protestant
worship reflects a reasonable attempt by the military chaplaincy to respond to
the diverse worship needs of Protestant Christians. Indeed, many chapels now
offer a range of Collective Protestant worship experiences, including Praise (or
Contemporary), Gospel (traditionally African-American), Liturgical and His-
panic Protestant.394
Chaplains may be excused from participating in Collective Protestant
worship if they object, on grounds of religious conscience, to the form or con-
tent of the worship.395 Nonetheless, even Protestant faith traditions that have a
long history of denominational distinctness often find ways in which their clergy
may lead Collective Protestant worship. The practices of the Lutheran Church -
Missouri Synod (LCMS) provide an especially useful example. The LCMS is
well known for its opposition to current trends in Protestant ecumenism, which
seeks to reduce or eliminate the distinctiveness of Protestant groups and has
396been especially influential among the "mainline" churches. In recent years,
the LCMS made national headlines when it sought to discipline one of its pas-
tors, Rev. Dr. David H. Benke, for his participation in an interfaith prayer ser-
vices in the days following the September 11, 2001, attacks.397  Benke was
charged with syncretism, for publicly praying with non-Christians and implying
the equality of faiths. 398 He was also charged with unionism, for praying with
Christians outside the Lutheran confession and implying the equal truth of all
Christian confessions. 399 Although Benke was later acquitted of the charges, the
episode reveals the depth of the LCMS tradition against participation in worship
with non-Lutherans. 4°°
393 HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 87.
394 Chambers, supra note 381, at 83-84.
395 Id. at 86-87.
396 See generally LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD, THE LUTHERAN UNDERSTANDING OF
CHURCH FELLOWSHIP: A REPORT ON SYNODICAL DISCUSSIONS (2001), http://www.lcms.org/graph-
ics/assets/media/CTCR/chfellfinal.pdf (discussing LCMS understanding of relationships among
Christian church bodies).
397 Daniel J. Wakin, Seeing Heresy In a Service For Sept. 11; Pastor Is Under Fire For Inter-
faith Prayers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at BI. See also Daniel J. Wakin, Preparing to Take on
His Church, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at B3.
398 Alan Cooperman, New York Lutheran Leader Suspended; Synod Seeks Pastor's Apology for
Praying With 'Pagans'After Sept. 11 Attacks, WASH. POST, July 6, 2002, at A2.
399 Id.
4W Associated Press, Lutheran Panel Reinstates Pastor After Post-9/11 Interfaith Service, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2003, at B4.
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Nonetheless, the LCMS has created a pattern of ministry for its en-
dorsed military chaplains that makes significant room for pluralist practices.40
The Synod's guidelines endorse the participation of LCMS chaplains in coop-
erative ministry with other chaplains "[a]s long as a LCMS chaplain is not di-
rected to do anything contrary to the Holy Scriptures and the Lutheran Confes-
sions. ''4 2 Specifically, the LCMS chaplain may support or supervise the work
of other, non-Lutheran chaplains, provide pastoral care to all service members
and their families and facilitate the religious exercise of those of any faith.4 °3 As
long as the elements of worship do not contradict the church body's confessions,
LCMS chaplains may lead Collective Protestant services. 4°4 The LCMS chap-
laincy guidelines limit this cooperation in two ways: LCMS chaplains should
not lead worship, or participate in other religious services, with non-Lutheran
clergy; and LCMS clergy should only lead communion services for Lutheran
congregations. 405 Thus, LCMS clergy can lead Collective Protestant services so
long as the services do not involve shared pastoral leadership with non-Lutheran
clergy, and as long as the service does not include communion. 4°6 The guide-
lines urge LCMS chaplains to "cooperate with other chaplains who can fulfill
denominational needs that they are unable to meet.,
407
Finally, the LCMS guidelines remind chaplains that, as a matter of the
regulations covering chaplains in all branches of the military, they may decline
to perform any religious acts that are contrary to the teachings of their faith.40 8
This right of all chaplains to object, on grounds of religious conscience, to par-
ticipation in assigned religious tasks is an important aspect of the practice of
Collective Protestant worship.4°9 This practice rests on voluntary cooperation
by chaplains-and of course by congregants-in designing and participating in
a worship service that typically includes parts of worship that are broadly shared
among Protestant churches.410
In this respect, the service represents a conscious tradeoff by both the
chaplaincy and the military parishioners. They exchange the distinctiveness, but
likely small numbers, of worship restricted to a particular denomination, for the
diverse and more broadly attended experience of Collective Protestant wor-
401 LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD, CHAPLAIN GUIDELINES (Rev. 2004),
http://www.lcms.org/graphics/assets/media/World%20Mission/Chaplain-Guidelines.pdf.
402 Id. at 23.
403 Id. at 23-25.
404 Id. at 33.
405 Id. at 24-25.
406 Id. at 33-34. See also HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 50.
407 LCMS CHAPLAIN GUIDELINES, supra note 401, at 25.
408 Id. at 24.
4N See AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, at sec. 2.1; AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4-4.e.;
OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1D, supra note 10, at sec. 5.e.(l 1).
410 DRAZIN & CURREY, supra note 33, at 40-41; HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 87.
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ship.411 Chaplains remain willing to facilitate, where possible, the distinctive
practices of Protestant bodies, as of other faith groups, but the Establishment
Clause permits the military to facilitate arrangements for worship that involve
non-distinctive approaches to prayer.
The practice of Collective Protestant worship raises one final question.
If a Protestant chaplain refuses, on religious grounds, to lead Collective Protes-
tant worship and restricts performance of religious acts to those of the chap-
lain's own faith group, may the military take such a refusal into account in
evaluating the chaplain's fitness for continued service? The military services
expressly permit chaplains to exercise such objections, so one might assume that
the objections are not prejudicial to the chaplain's career.412 Although the mili-
tary may take that approach, they are under no obligation to ignore the signifi-
cance of objections. As noted above, the military decides on accessions (both
into the chaplaincy of the Reserve Components, and also into Active Duty ser-
vice) based, at least in part, on the specific religious needs of service mem-
413bers.  If a Protestant chaplain is willing to lead Collective Protestant worship,
he or she will be able to serve a broader range of service members than a chap-
lain who is willing only to conduct worship for a specific Protestant denomina-
414tion.4 1 The military does not engage in impermissible religious discrimination
if it takes a chaplain's attitude toward Collective Protestant worship into account
so long as the decision is grounded on the underlying justification for the chap-
laincy-the accommodation of service members' religious needs.
2. Prayer at Official Ceremonies
Over the past several years, the practice of public prayer by military
chaplains has attracted more attention and controversy than any other aspect of
the chaplaincy.415 Controversy over the practice has focused on the singular
question of whether chaplains may offer sectarian prayers at military ceremo-
nies. More specifically, conservative and evangelical Protestant chaplains assert
411 HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 86-87.
412 Chambers, supra note 381, at 86-87.
413 See Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2007).
414 Chambers, supra note 381, at 87.
415 For legal commentary, see generally Dobosh, supra note 4; Rosen, supra note 4, at 1158-64.
See also, e.g., Neela Bannerjee, Proposal on Military Chaplains and Prayer Holds Up Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A19; Alan Cooperman, Chaplains Group Opposes Prayer Order; Guar-
antee on Using Jesus's Name Not Needed, It Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2006, at A4. Contro-
versy over prayer at military ceremonies is not merely a recent phenomena. See Arnold E. Resni-
coff, Prayers that Hurt: Public Prayer in Interfaith Settings, MIL. CHAPLAINS' REV. (Winter
1987), http://www.resnicoff.net/prayersthat hurt.htm; Betram Gilbert, On Prayers in Jesus'
Name, MIL. CHAPLAINS' REV. 123 (Fall 1987); LOVELAND, supra note 250, at 307-09 (on disputes
over public prayer in the early 1990s).
[Vol. I110
60
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss1/10
INSTRUMENTS OF A CCOMMODA TION
the freedom to pray "in the name of Jesus Christ," regardless of the context in
which the prayer is offered.1 6
This question has produced an ongoing political and legal battle. In
February 2006, both the Air Force and the Navy issued guidelines that included
restrictions on the use of sectarian language in ceremonial prayer.4 7 The Air
Force guidelines arose from a broad review of religious practices and policies
originally sparked by allegations of religious intolerance and inappropriate
proselytizing at the Air Force Academy.418 The guidelines provided the follow-
ing advice concerning ceremonial prayers:
Public prayer should not imply government endorsement of re-
ligion and should not usually be a part of routine business. Mu-
tual respect and common sense should always be applied, in-
cluding consideration of unusual circumstances and the needs of
the command. Further, non-denominational, inclusive prayer or
a moment of silence may be appropriate for military ceremonies
or events of special importance when its primary purpose is not
the advancement of religious beliefs. Military chaplains are
trained in these matters.1 9
Later that same month, the Secretary of the Navy issued a new instruc-
tion covering a wide range of issues involving religion. This instruction carried
similar advice regarding ceremonial prayer:
In planning command functions, commanders shall determine
whether a religious element is appropriate. In considering the
appropriateness for including a religious element, commanders,
with appropriate advice from a chaplain, should assess the set-
ting and context of the function; the diversity of faith that may
be represented among the participants; and whether the function
is mandatory for all hands. Other than Divine/Religious Ser-
vices, religious elements for a command function, absent ex-
traordinary circumstances, should be non-sectarian in nature.
Neither the participation of chaplain, nor the inclusion of a reli-
416 Editorial, We Have a Mess! What Now MCA?, 79 THE Mn.. CHAPLAIN 5, 3 (Sept.-Oct.
2006); Julia Duin, White House to Push Military on Jesus Prayer, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at
A3; John B. Murdoch & Gary R. Pollitt, Statement on Religious Free Exercise Controversies, 79
THE MIL. CHAPLAIN 1, 3-4 (Jan.-Feb. 2006).
417 U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, GUIDELINES, REVISED INTERIM GUIDELINES CONCERNING FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION IN THE AIR FORCE (09 Feb. 2006) [hereinafter AF RI GUIDELINES], avail-
able at www.af.mil/library/guidelines.pdf; SEC'Y OF NAVY, U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, INSTR. 1730.7C,
RELIGIOUS MINISTRIES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (21 Feb. 2006) [hereinafter
SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7C] (rescinded 26 Nov. 2006).
418 See generally, Cook, supra note 4; Schweiker, supra note 4.
419 AF RI GUIDELINES, supra note 417.
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gious element, in and of themselves, renders a command func-
tion a Divine Service or public worship.4 z°
Moreover, the Navy instruction explicitly assigned responsibility to
commanders, rather than chaplains, for the content of ceremonial prayer. The
Navy instruction continued:
Once a commander determines a religious element is appropri-
ate, the chaplain may choose to participate based on his or her
faith constraints. If the chaplain chooses not to participate, he or
she may do so with no adverse consequences. Anyone accepting
a commander's invitation to provide religious elements at a
command function is accountable for following the com-
mander' s guidance.42'
Opponents of the new policies, both inside and outside the military, fo-
cused on both the content restrictions and the allocation of command author-
ity.422 These critics argued that the restrictions on prayer violated the rights of
chaplains by forbidding them from praying in the manner required by their reli-
gious beliefs, and by subjecting the content of their prayers to oversight by mili-
423tary superiors. Led by the American Center for Law and Justice, Focus on the
Family and a number of other conservative and evangelical Protestant organiza-
tions, opponents of the policies attracted the attention of federal legislators.
424
In response to these efforts, a number of influential organizations came
forward to actively support the Air Force and Navy polices. Both the National
Association of Evangelicals and the National Conference on Ministry to the
Armed Forces expressed their approval of inclusive prayer in ceremonial set-
tings.425
Responding favorably to the conservative critique, the House approved
legislation that would have given military chaplains "the prerogative to pray
according to the dictates of the chaplain's own conscience, except as must be
420 SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7C, supra note 417 (rescinded 26 Nov. 2006 by direction of legisla-
tive conferees on Defense appropriations bill). See also Navy Chief of Chaplains, Official State-
ment on Public Prayer in the Navy (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter OPNAV Statement on Prayer],
http://www.religionandpolicy.org/show.php?p= 1.1.1726&PHPSESSID=4ca36734aeef750435952
c8841 a2ee6e) (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
421 Id.
422 See Alan Cooperman, A Noisy Takeoff for Air Force Guidelines on Religion; Evangelical
Christians Contend Restrictions Imperil Free Exercise, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2005, at A20.
423 Id.
424 American Center for Law & Justice, Update on Military Chaplains & Prayer,
http://www.aclj.org/News/Readwr.aspx?ID=2498 (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
425 The National Association of Evangelicals, Statement on Religious Freedom for Soldiers and
Military Chaplains (Feb. 7, 2006); NCMAF News Release (Feb. 9, 2006). These two groups
represent a wide range of religious bodies that endorse military chaplains.
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limited by military necessity, with any such limitation being imposed in the least
restrictive manner feasible.' 426 The Senate did not pass such a measure, and the
House provision was dropped in conference over the 2007 Defense Appropria-
427tions Act. As a compromise between the contending forces, however, the con-
ferees demanded that the Navy and Air Force rescind the policy directives con-
cerning non-sectarian prayer at military ceremonies. 28 In the wake of the legis-
lative conferees' direction to rescind the challenged policies, the Air Force and
Navy reinstated the guidelines on chaplaincy that were in place before the 2006
revisions. 429 The preexisting guidelines do not address the issue of ceremonial
prayer, although a policy letter by the Navy Chief of Chaplains, which contains
essentially the same instructions on ceremonial prayer as the rescinded guide-
lines, still appears to be in effect.
430
The debate over chaplains' ceremonial prayer raises questions of the
chaplains' asserted right to pray as their faith requires, as well as the potential
Establishment Clause limitations on ceremonial prayers at certain military
events. The context for both inquiries is the same. Military chaplains are regu-
larly asked to provide an invocation or other prayer at a military command
ceremony, such as a "dining in',4 31 or change of command. The ceremony will
usually include service members who are required to attend, and the chaplain
will typically appear in military uniform (rather than worship vestments).432
Finally, service regulations provide that chaplains are free to decline, without
prejudice, invitations to pray at military ceremonies,433 though most chaplains
acknowledge experiencing some degree of expectation that they will partici-
pate.
434
426 H.R. 5122, Sec. 590(a).
427 See Howard M. Friedman, Compromise on Chaplains in Defense Appropriations Act, (Oct.
2, 2006), http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2006/10/compromise-on-chaplains-in-defense.htm.
See also Neela Bannerjee, Chaplain Prayer Provision Cut From Military Spending Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at Al.
428 Conference Report, DW 1 10-H590-Military Chaplains (Sept. 25, 2006).
429 SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7B, supra note 219 (Navy policy reinstated Nov. 26, 2006); AF
PoucY DIR. 52-1, supra note 10 (Air Force policy reinstated Oct. 2, 2006).
430 OPNAV Statement on Prayer, supra note 420.
431 A "dining in" ceremony is a formal (and highly ritualized) dinner of the military unit. See
United States Military Academy, Guide to Military Dining-In, available at
http://www.usma.edu/Protocol/images/DiningInOutGUIDE.pdf.
432 AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4-4.d. (chaplains may wear religious vestments for worship
services, but while otherwise on duty wear the military uniform; "chaplains scarf, stole, or tallit"
are permitted in addition to the uniform). See also Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1532-34 (on manda-
tory attendance at military formations).
433 AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4-4.h. ("Military and patriotic ceremonies may require a
chaplain to provide an invocation, reading, prayer, or benediction. Such occasions are not consid-
ered to be religious services. Chaplains will not be required to offer a prayer, if doing so would be
in variance with the tenets or practices of their faith group.").
434 Wildhack, supra note 4, at 245-46 & nn. 186-87.
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On the question of a chaplain's right to pray "according to the dictates
of the chaplain's own conscience" as part of a military ceremony to which the
chaplain has been invited, proponents of such a right have invoked a variety of
different legal bases. These include the chaplain's constitutional or statutory
rights to free exercise of religion and free speech;435 the regulatory or statutory
provisions that authorize chaplains "to conduct rites, sacraments, and services as
required by their respective denominations;,,436 and asserted Establishment
Clause limits on governmental endorsement of a theological position-in this
case, the position associated with a requirement that ceremonial prayer be non-
sectarian.437
With respect to the constitutional or statutory rights of expression and
religious exercise, proponents of unrestricted prayer at ceremonies contend that
the proposed policies reflect content-based regulation of speech and impose a
substantial burden on chaplains' freedom to pray in their chosen manner. None
of the proponents' arguments is persuasive. The free speech claim founders on
the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,438 discussed above, which
held that government employees do not enjoy constitutional protection for job-
related expression in the course of their employment. 439 The only way that
chaplains could avoid the implications of Garcetti would be to argue that cere-
monial prayer is an act of private speech, but such a claim cannot be sustained
in this context.440 The chaplain is invited to pray precisely because of the chap-
lain's official position, and the chaplain participates because such acts are
deemed part of the chaplain's official role within the military. 44 1 While there
are settings in which it might be reasonable to claim that a speaker invited to
pray at a ceremonial function does so as a private individual, and thus enjoys
442some protection for the content of that prayer, the ceremonial prayers of mili-
tary chaplains possess none of those characteristics.
435 Arthur Schulcz, Blow the Trumpet in Zion, INT'L CONFERENCE OF EVANGELICAL CHRISTIAN
ENDORSERS NEWSLETrER, Oct. 2006, at 3-5; Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1541-49.
436 AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4-4.e. The chaplains' lawyers have not pressed this argu-
ment in their written efforts on the subject. We surmise that they do not rely heavily on this pro-
vision because military ceremonies are not "rites, sacraments, or services" within its meaning.
437 Schulcz, supra note 435, at 3 ("The Navy has established an official Navy religion and
violated the Establishment Clause's mandated government neutrality in the area of religion by
defining 'nonsectarian' prayer as the only acceptable religious speech at Navy functions. The
Establishment Clause forbids government to make pronouncements as to the rightness or wrong-
ness of religious concepts or beliefs unless a religious doctrine dictates a practice clearly at odds
with the norms of American civil society.").
438 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
439 Id. at 1962; see also supra notes 348-61 and accompanying text (discussing Garcetti).
440 But see Schulcz, supra note 435, at 4.
441 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, at 4.4.h. ("Military and patriotic ceremonies may require
a chaplain to provide an invocation, reading, prayer, or benediction.").
442 The argument would depend on the extent to which the invitation to deliver the prayer-and
the broader context of the ceremony-might be reasonably understood to reflect the preferences
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The most ambitious-but least plausible-argument under the Speech
Clause is that prayer by chaplains at ceremonies must be private speech because
official religious speech at such functions would violate the Establishment
Clause. 443 That argument, however, is completely self-serving and entirely il-
logical. It is akin to arguing that the display of the Ten Commandments in the
McCreary County Courthouse must represent the private speech of the County
Commissioners because the display would violate the Establishment Clause if it
were attributed to the County." 4  By this logic, all governmental expression in
support of sectarian religion could be redefined as the private speech of some
government official, and therefore be deemed free of Establishment Clause re-
strictions. There is no reason to expect courts to be persuaded by this sophistry;
the law determines whether or not speech is public or private by looking at the
context in which the speaker operates, not by the completely result-oriented
technique of examining first the constitutional consequence of labeling speech
as public or private.
The free exercise claims of chaplains are no more compelling than the
assertions of free speech rights. Proponents of faith-specific ceremonial prayer
make two different kinds of arguments. One asserts that the restriction on sec-
tarian prayer discriminates against Protestant evangelicals for whom prayer "in
the name of Jesus" is a religious obligation."46 Such a definition of discrimina-
tion has no support in constitutional jurisprudence. The restrictions on ceremo-
of an individual (perhaps a person being honored in retirement) rather than the government. In
Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005), a case involving a challenge to sectar-
ian prayers in the Indiana legislature, appellants have raised the private speech forum argument in
their briefs defending the practice. Hinrichs remains pending on appeal in the 7th Circuit. Relig-
ion Clause, 7th Circuit Hears Arguments in Indiana Legislative Prayer Case,
http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2006/o9/7th-circuit-hears-arguments-in-indiana.htm (Sept. 8,
2006).
443 Schulcz, supra note 435, at 4 ("Religious speech provided at Navy functions must be 'pri-
vate speech' since the Navy is forbidden from taking an active part in religion or providing its
own religious speech."). Mr. Schulcz represents the plaintiffs in Larsen and other cases involving
evangelical Christians who are suing the Navy with respect to the current policies governing chap-
lains. Ken Walker, 5th Lawsuit by Navy Chaplains Adds to Discrimination Charges, CHRISTIAN
EXAMINER ONLINE (Aug. 2006), http://www.christianexaminer.com/Articles/Articles%2OAugO6
/Art_Aug06.08.html. See also Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2007) (list of
plaintiffs' counsel).
4 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (invalidating display of Ten
Commandments because it had been undertaken for constitutionally forbidden purposes of pro-
moting religious ideas).
445 For a detailed and nuanced examination of the context of speech by military officials, de-
termining when such speech should be treated as official government speech, see Fitzkee &
Letendre, supra note 4, at 36-43.
446 Id.; Complaint at 33, 43, 111, 118, 112, Klingenschmitt v. Winter, No. 1:106-cv-01832-
HHK (D.D.C. 2006) [hereinafter Klingenschmitt complaint]; see also Schulcz, supra note 435, at
5. A similar claim has been raised in a recent lawsuit over restrictions on sectarian prayer in a city
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nial prayer are formally neutral with respect to all denominations. No person
may pray using the distinctive terms of a particular faith group, and especially
the distinctive name for the faith group's understanding of divinity.447 Muslims,
Jews and Christians of all stripes are equally bound by the regulation. It is un-
doubtedly true that some find it easier to work within such restrictions, while
others experience the restrictions as unreasonable constraints. The same could
be said, however, of the chaplaincy's fundamental expectations of pluralism.
448
Not all ministers or faith groups are willing to accept the limitations on ministry
imposed by the norm of pluralism, even in its more pragmatic form. Their un-
willingness to accept the restrictions of pluralistic ministry does not transform
the chaplaincy's norm into a forbidden discrimination.
The other claim of religious liberty, advanced by the defenders of sec-
tarian prayer at military ceremonies, relies on the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (RFRA). 449 Proponents of this position assert that the restrictions on
ceremonial prayer impose a substantial burden on the religious liberty of chap-
lains, and that the burden is not justified as the least restrictive means to achieve
a compelling government interest. 450 It is unlikely that a court would find the
restriction on prayer to be a substantial burden on free exercise, because the
military regulations already excuse any chaplain from participating in ceremo-
nial prayers if such prayers are inconsistent with the chaplain's religious be-
liefs.451 Such opt-outs have always been deemed a sufficient means for address-
ing both free exercise and free speech concerns about government-compelled
speech.452 The only cases in which opt-outs have been found constitutionally
insufficient involve practices that violate the Establishment Clause, such as
prayer in public schools.453
In order to escape the dilemma of preferred opt-outs as a fully sufficient
response to their concerns, those who oppose the restrictions on sectarian prayer
at ceremonies contend that such restrictions violate the Establishment Clause by
creating a preference for nonsectarian religion over sectarian religion.454 Any
447 SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7C, supra note 417 (rescinded Nov. 26, 2006), at sec. 6(c) ("Other
than Divine/Religious Services, religious elements for a command function, absent extraordinary
circumstances, should be non-sectarian in nature."). See also Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1560 (de-
scribing services' public prayer policies).
"8 See supra notes 335-80 and accompanying text (discussing pluralism in the conduct of
military chaplaincy).
449 Klingenschmitt complaint, supra note 446, at V 125-130.
450 Id.
451 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4.4.e. See also SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7C, supra
note 417, at sec. 6(c) ("Once a commander determines a religious element is appropriate, the
chaplain may choose to participate based on his or her faith constraints. If the chaplain chooses
not to participate, he or she may do so with no adverse consequences.").
452 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
453 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963).
454 Klingenschmitt complaint, supra note 446,919125-32.
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attempt to define prayer along those lines, they argue, reflects governmental
endorsement of a particular version of religious faith.455
This argument is closely related to the claim that ceremonial prayer
must be treated as private speech in order to survive Establishment Clause scru-
tiny, and the argument suffers from the same fundamental defect. The defect is
evident in proponents' reliance on Lee v. Weisman456 as authority for this argu-
ment.457 In Lee, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a practice of nonsec-
tarian prayer at public school graduation ceremonies.458 The Court ruled that the
nonsectarian quality of the prayer was irrelevant; any form of government-
sponsored prayer in public schools violates the Establishment Clause. 459 The
decision does not stand for the proposition that nonsectarian and sectarian
prayer are legally indistinguishable in all contexts, and it certainly does not
stand for the proposition that the defect in the practice rested in the school's
failure to label the prayer as private speech. Instead, Lee v. Weisman reflects the
Court's heightened sensitivity about the coercive effect of religious exercises in
public schools. 46 0 Outside that context, many courts have been willing to recog-
nize a distinction between nonsectarian invocations and sectarian prayers, per-
mitting the former but not the latter in public ceremonies. 461 Indeed the Su-
preme Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers, which upheld against Establish-
ment Clause challenge the practice of legislative prayer, suggested the impor-
462tance of that distinction.
The claim that non-sectarian and sectarian prayer are constitutionally
indistinguishable-that either both are forbidden or both are permit-
ted-ultimately fails for reasons deeply rooted in Establishment Clause norms.
Ceremonial prayer in the military is most persuasively analogized to legislative
prayer, a practice upheld by the Court in Marsh v. Chambers.463 In Marsh,
plaintiffs challenged the existence of a paid chaplain for the Nebraska's state
455 Schulcz, supra note 435, at 3-4.
456 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
457 Schulcz, supra note 435, at 3.
458 505 U.S. at 598-99.
459 See id. at 589-90.
4W Id. at 592. See also Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1508-09 (describing coercion test from Lee v.
Weisman).
461 See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006) (denial of stay). In denying a petition
to stay an injunction imposed on the Indiana state legislature's practice of prayer, which included
frequent sectarian invocations-and no policy against such invocations-the court drew a sharp
line between sectarian and nonsectarian prayer in the legislative context. Id. at 398-402. The
Rutherford Institute has aggressively advanced this position in its legal advice to local legislatures.
See John Whitehead, Memorandum: Prayer at City Council Meetings: Analysis and Guidelines
(October 2004), http://www.rutherford.org/PDF/10-15_TownCouncil.pdf (last visited Sept. 5,
2007).
462 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983).
463 Id. at 783.
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legislature, and the legislature's practice of opening each day of the session with
a prayer by the chaplain. 464 The Court held that Nebraska's legislative chap-
laincy did not violate the Establishment Clause, although the rationale for the
holding is complicated and contested.465
Much of the Court's opinion in Marsh focused on the long history of the
practice of legislative prayer, which had continued for over a century in Ne-
braska, tracking a similar pattern which had persisted since the beginning days
of the federal legislature. 6 The Court found that this history suggests that the
drafters of the First Amendment did not regard legislative chaplaincies as reli-
467gious establishments.
The outcome in Marsh did not turn on history alone. The Court identi-
fied several features of the prayer - historical and present - that substantially
mitigated concerns about religious establishments.4 8  First, the Court said that
"the Founding Fathers looked at invocations as 'conduct whose ... effect...
harmonized with the tenets of some or all religions.' The Establishment Clause
does not always bar a state from regulating conduct simply because it 'harmo-
nizes with religious canons."469 Although its explanation is not a model of clar-
ity, the Court appeared to be arguing that legislative prayers should not be
treated as religious activities, but as a solemnizing event that "harmonizes" with
the religious activity of prayer. Second, the Court emphasized that those who
claimed injury from the legislative prayer were adults, and, thus, "presumably
not readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination.' ' 470 Third, the Court said that
the content of prayer was not material to the constitutionality of the practice
"where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been ex-
ploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.,
471
Taken together, these three features suggest the boundaries of the
Court's reliance on history to uphold the practice of legislative prayer. Al-
though lower courts have increasingly wrestled with application of these
boundaries in a variety of legislative settings, from state legislatures to local
school boards, these courts have also recognized that Marsh does not provide
blanket justification for every practice that might be called "legislative
prayer.''472 Context has played an important role in these decisions. Courts
464 Id. at 784-85.
465 See id. at 792-95.
466 Id. at 786-92.
467 Id. at 792.
468 Id. at 793-95.
469 Id. at 792 (citations omitted).
470 Id.
471 Id. at 794-95.
472 Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004); Rubin v. City of Burbank, 124
Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (Ct. App. 2002).
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have distinguished traditional public legislative assemblies, in which adult par-
ticipants come and go freely, from settings such as meetings of public school
boards, which schoolchildren may sometimes be required to attend.473 Courts
have also examined the types of prayer offered, and a number of decisions have
concluded that a pattern of sectarian prayers should be treated differently than
the practice at issue in Marsh.4 74
This twofold concern about context and content guides application of
Marsh to chaplains' prayers at military ceremonies. In sharp contrast to ordi-
nary legislative assemblies, service members are typically commanded to attend
military ceremonies, and, thus, do not have the option of avoiding prayer if they
desire to do SO. 4 75 In this respect, service members more closely approximate
schoolchildren, despite the difference in age.476 The fact that service members
attend ceremonies under orders is also relevant to assessment of the prayers'
content. Marsh suggested that legislative prayers would be constitutionally vul-
nerable if they were "exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to dispar-
age any other, faith or belief."477 A court might be unwilling to treat the simple
coda "in Jesus' name" as exploitative in a legislative setting, where listeners are
at liberty to excuse themselves, but the same phrase might be treated quite dif-
ferently in prayer before a "captive audience."
The application of Marsh to the context of military ceremonies under-
scores the implausibility of the claim made by proponents of sectarian prayer
that such prayers are indistinguishable from non-sectarian prayers. That claim
assumes that both sectarian and non-sectarian prayers constitute religious activi-
ties. Marsh and its lower court progeny, however, depend on the finding that, at
least in some circumstances, prayers are not religious activities but secular ac-
tivities that "harmonize" with common religious practices. 78 The three features
identified by the Court in Marsh focus on the extent to which legislative prayer
resembles a religious activity, including the purpose of the prayer's message and
473 Coles ex rel. Coles v. Tracy, 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999) (striking down school board
prayer); Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 52 F. App'x 355 (9th Cir. 2002)
(unpublished order) (striking down school board prayer).
474 Compare Wynne, 376 F.3d at 292 (striking down practice of sectarian prayer), with Simpson
v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding practice of
nonsectarian prayer, but permitting board to deny invitation to Wiccan practitioner because no
general invitation is extended to the public).
475 Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1532-34; Wildhack, supra note 4, at 246.
476 The Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992), emphasized the coercive effect of
the prayers, even at a formally optional event like a middle school or high school graduation. The
coercive effect of prayer upon service members compelled to attend a ceremony is obviously
stronger than that involved in Lee. See also Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003)
(enjoining supper prayer at Virginia Military Institute on grounds of its coercive effect on cadets).
See Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1513-17 (discussing Mellen). See also Wildhack, supra note 4, at
245-46 (discussing conduct of chaplains at effectively mandatory events).
477 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
478 See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 282-83 (discussing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).
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the experience of the audience.479 The more the practice resembles a normal
religious event, the less likely the practice will withstand challenge under the
Establishment Clause. Seen in that light, the practice of sectarian prayer at mili-
tary ceremonies is far more constitutionally vulnerable than most legislative
prayer.
Even if sectarian prayer at military ceremonies does not represent a
categorical violation of the Establishment Clause, the possibility that it might be
such a violation generates discretionary authority in the military to forbid prayer
of that character. Under Marsh, sectarian prayer that is "exploited to proselytize
or advance any one ... faith or belief"A 80 at ceremonies would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. The concern to guard against violation of that standard would
provide the military with a zone of discretion, in which courts would be highly
unlikely to second-guess determinations of the appropriate content for such
prayers, especially given the "captive audience" for ceremonial prayers in the
military setting.48'
A variety of powerful constitutional themes-the anti-coercion concern
expressed in Lee,48 2 the boundaries of ceremonial prayer suggested in Marsh
483
and the deference to military authorities with respect to religion as expressed in
Goldman484 -thus coalesce to support a military policy precluding sectarian
prayer at ceremonies. Whatever "burdens" such a preclusion may impose on the
religious liberty interests of chaplains, anti-coercion concerns for service mem-
bers in attendance and respect for Establishment Clause norms amply satisfy
RFRA's requirement of compelling interests as well as any constitutionally-
based requirement to justify such a preclusion.485
In addition, the policy of "minimal religious pluralism," discussed
above, provides yet one more reason to restrict sectarian prayer in ceremonial
settings which service members are obliged to attend.486 Indeed, all the argu-
ments for minimal pluralism, and against a theory of chaplains' rights that
would undercut such pluralism, are far stronger in the setting of ceremonial
prayer than in the context of worship services. For that reason, the suggestion
479 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786, 790-92 (emphasizing traditional and ceremonial attributes of prac-
tice, and stressing absence of proof that prayers were "exploited" to advance particular religious
beliefs).
480 Id. at 792.
481 See Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 25-30 (D.D.C. 2007) (invoking deferential
standard from Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), to assess constitutional claims raised
by chaplains).
482 See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
483 See generally Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783.
484 See generally Goldman, 475 U.S. 503.
485 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 730 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (government has
a compelling interest in avoiding Establishment Clause violations) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 271 (1981)).
486 See supra notes 362-68 and accompanying text (discussing minimal pluralism).
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that the problem of sectarian prayer can be solved by permitting service mem-
bers who object to such prayer to "opt-out" of the relevant ceremonies seems
profoundly misplaced. The military inevitably must choose between chaplains'
interests to pray as they choose in official ceremonies and service members'
rights to not be driven from those ceremonies by hostile or alienating religious
sentiments. Along with considerations of law, the concern for religious plural-
ism and the accompanying spirit of unity that the military seeks to inspire point
strenuously in favor of a restriction on sectarian prayer in these settings.
4 87
3. Pastoral Care
Issues of religious discrimination, pluralism and sectarian public prayers
have captured significant public attention, but the practice of pastoral care by
military chaplains might prove to be even more constitutionally sensitive and
complex.488 Pastoral care encompasses a broad range of encounters between
clergy and others, and these encounters may occur in an equally broad range of
settings.489 Chaplains visit the sick or injured in hospitals, engage in formal
counseling sessions with service members and their families, hear private con-
fession from congregants, talk informally with soldiers as they ride along on a
convoy or share a meal at a forward operating base, or sit with a colleague over
coffee in a headquarters office building.
The diverse contexts of pastoral care give rise to the constitutional com-
plexity of the practice because a model of such care appropriate in one setting
may be legally problematic in another. Consider two common occasions for
pastoral care. In the first, a service member visits the post chapel on a large
domestic installation and makes an appointment with a specific chaplain, one of
six clergy of different and clearly identified faiths on the chapel staff. In the
second, a military hospital chaplain visits the room of an injured service mem-
ber to determine the patient's religious needs. Under normal circumstances, the
first chaplain can reasonably assume that the service member scheduled the ap-
pointment because of the chaplain's distinctive religious commitments. The
chaplain's care might involve religious instruction and-if the service member
did not share the chaplain's faith, or did not embrace it with full inten-
sity-perhaps even efforts at religious persuasion. Such a robust religious en-
counter between chaplain and service member fits perfectly within the model of
religious accommodation. The service member selected this particular opportu-
487 See Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 4, at 5-6; Wildhack, supra note 4, at 247, 247 n. 199 (on
unit cohesion).
488 See HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 62-64.
489 The armed services include a range of pastoral care tasks within the specified duties of
chaplains. AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, at sec. 4; AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4-4.k.;
OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1D, supra note 10, at sec. 5.b.(4). On pastoral care more generally, see
HOWARD JOHN CLINEBELL, BASIC TYPES OF PASTORAL CARE AND COUNSELING: RESOURCES FOR
THE MINISTRY OF HEALING AND GROWTH (Abingdon Press 1984).
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nity for religious experience from a menu of choices, and did so in a context that
appears to minimize the risk of exploitation.
In the second context, however, the model of robust religious encounter
sits uneasily with the constitutional structure of religious accommodation. The
injured service member is not likely to have selected this particular chaplain,
and the hospital setting suggests the possibility that the service member might
be especially vulnerable to attempts at religious indoctrination or influence. In
this context, the military must require chaplains to adopt a model of pastoral
care that affords heightened protection for the service member. Such a model,
reflected in the standards for Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE), emphasizes the
responsive character of pastoral care. 490 The chaplain elicits and develops the
patient's own religious commitments, rather than imposing on the patient the
religious views of the chaplain.
Indeed, every court that has considered a constitutional challenge to a
hospital chaplaincy program has approved of the CPE model of responsive care
and has suggested the constitutional infirmity of a model that would permit
proselytizing by chaplains. In Baz v. Walters,49 1 the Seventh Circuit rejected an
employment discrimination claim brought by a former chaplain in the Veterans
Administration hospital system.492 The chaplain claimed, among other things,
that the hospital dismissed him from his position because he refused, on reli-
gious grounds, to conform to the "institutional theology" of pastoral care estab-
lished by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).49 ' This institutional theol-
ogy, he argued, prohibited him from engaging in the explicitly evangelical out-
reach to patients that his faith required.494 The court rejected his claim and said
that the VA's restrictions on his chaplaincy were constitutionally required:
[Tihe V.A. must ensure that the existence of the chaplaincy
does not create establishment clause problems. Unleashing a
government-paid chaplain who sees his primary role as prosely-
tizing upon a captive audience of patients could do exactly that.
The V.A. has established rules and regulations to ensure that
those patients who do not wish to entertain a chaplain's ministry
need not be exposed to it. Far from defining its own institu-
tional theology, the medical and religious staffs at Danville are
490 See Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 667 F. Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (S.D. Iowa 1987), aff'd in
part, modified in part, 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988) (describing CPE model of pastoral care). See
also Freedom from Religion Found. v. Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612-13 (W.D. Wis. 2007)
(describing CPE model); HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 63-64 (CPE and military chaplaincy).
491 782 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1986).
492 Id. at 709.
493 Id.
494 Id. at 705, 709.
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merely attempting to walk a fine constitutional line while safe-
guarding the health and well-being of the patients.495
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Carter v. Broad-
lawns Medical Center,4 96 which involved an Establishment Clause challenge to
a public hospital chaplaincy program.49 7 The court ruled that the chaplaincy
program did not violate the Establishment Clause because the chaplain's role
was designed to accommodate the religious needs of hospital patients and their
families.49 8 In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized the CPE model of
pastoral care in which "the religious content in [the chaplain's] services to a
patient depended entirely on the patient's pre-existing preferences." 99  The
court also stressed the important role played by the paid chaplain in "super-
vis[ing] the volunteer chaplains to make sure they abide by the non-
proselytization principles of C.P.E. ' '5°°
Most recently, in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Nicholson,50 1 a
federal district court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the VA
healthcare chaplaincy program.0 2 The complaint alleged that the VA unconsti-
tutionally integrates religion into all aspects of its healthcare, and that it does so
through the chaplaincy's systematic engagement with each patient admitted to
the hospital system. 50 3 The court dismissed the lawsuit because it determined
that the chaplaincy program represented a constitutionally legitimate accommo-
dation of the free exercise needs of patients in VA facilities.50 4 As in Baz and
Carter, the court emphasized the structure and limitations of the CPE model
chaplaincy and found the VA's embrace of that model to be constitutionally
dispositive. 50 5 CPE-trained chaplains, the court found, assist patients to develop
the patients' own religious beliefs and spiritual resources rather than "initiating
or guiding religious instruction. ''506 Moreover, the VA's CPE-trained chaplains
"are proactive in eliminating proselytizing from their hospitals. As such, VA
pastoral care is religious in content only if that is the wish of a given patient.,
50 7
495 Id. at 709.
496 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988).
497 Id. at 450.
498 Id. at 456-57.
499 Id. at 455.
500 Id. at 456.
501 469 F. Supp. 2d 609 (W.D. Wis. 2007). See our analysis of this decision at the RT website:
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legallegal-update-display.cfm?id=55.
502 Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22.
503 Id. at 612-16.
504 Id. at 619-23.
505 Id.. at 621-23.
506 Id. at 613.
507 Id. at 613, 622-23.
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These first two settings of pastoral care-the large base chapel and the
military hospital-represent opposite ends of a spectrum, with maximal reli-
gious choice and minimal vulnerability at one end, and minimal choice and
heightened vulnerability at the other. Between these two poles, however, lie
much more difficult questions about the practice of pastoral care. Consider two
additional and equally common situations. In the third, a service member and
her husband, who are having marital difficulties, visit the base Family Life Cen-
ter, which offers trained pastoral counseling and support groups. 50 8 The service
member's unit commander suggested that she seek help from the Center because
her family trouble was interfering with her work. In the fourth, a service mem-
ber seeks the counsel of his unit chaplain who is deployed with the unit in a
remote operating base in Iraq.
The third setting-the Family Life Center-offers a number of features
found in each of the first two settings. On the one hand, the service member
visits the pastoral counselor voluntarily, and we might reasonably presume that
other opportunities or resources for marital counseling are available within the
community. On the other hand, the Center may hold itself out as a religiously
inclusive service provider more akin to a healthcare facility than a chapel, and
so the service member's encounter with a particular chaplain should not be
taken as acceptance of religious content that chaplain might offer. Moreover,
the specific need for counseling-especially on recommendation of a superior
-might indicate some degree of vulnerability to religious influence, though
perhaps not to the extent present in the hospital setting.
We would expect a military pastoral counseling center to resolve this
uncertainty through specific guidance for chaplains on the content of their care.
Such guidance might include formal agreements with potential clients about the
character and extent of religious language and commitments in the counseling
sessions, or other mechanisms to ensure that clients directed the religious con-
tent. Within the constitutional framework of accommodation, even thickly reli-
gious counseling may be appropriate so long as the recipients of such counsel-
ing have given meaningful consent to receiving it.
The fourth setting shares the ambiguities present in the third, although
in a significantly different context. As in the first example, the service member
visits the chaplain voluntarily with full awareness of the chaplain's religious
identity. However, the parallels with the first example end at that point. In a
remote area, the service member who wishes to confide in a chaplain is not
likely to have a great deal of choice; unless he waits for the occasional visit of
clergy of different faiths to provide formal worship, the service member will
have contact only with the unit's assigned chaplain.50 9 The service member, of
508 For an example of programs at one such facility, see the website for the Fort Wainwright
Chaplain Family Life Center: http://www.wainwright.army.mi/FWAFLC/.
509 See generally Kristin Henderson, Chaplains at War, WASH. POST MAG. (April 30, 2006), at
W04 (describing daily life for deployed chaplains in Iraq). See also Gregory J. Darr, For God &
Country: The Constitutional Question of the U.S. Army Chaplaincy, MIL. CHAPLAINS' REv. 95,
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course, may happen to share that chaplain's faith tradition, in which case this
setting more closely approximates the first. It is more likely, however, that the
service member and chaplain will not be of the same faith group. 510 The special
vulnerability associated with likely exposure to combat magnifies concern for
the service member, and brings this setting closer to that of chaplaincy in a hos-
pital environment.
Moreover, in contrast to the first three settings, this one presents a spe-
cial challenge because of the difficulty of formalizing or monitoring the rela-
tionship between chaplain and service member. The relationship may have pre-
existed the situation of danger, but it may well have arisen swiftly in contempla-
tion of that danger, and it may take place in a hurried and completely unsuper-
visable setting.
The fourth setting accordingly presents a unique and excruciating con-
stitutional dilemma. The temporal and spatial likelihood of grave physical dan-
ger, the absence of a service member's choice of particular faith affiliation on
the part of the chaplain, and the lack of formal supervision cumulatively present
a significant risk of unwanted religious persuasion in this context. At the same
time, however, some service members in this situation may experience a long-
ing, however articulated, for explicit, detailed religious inspiration and support.
Faced with this dilemma, a military that imposed an outright ban on religious
persuasion by chaplains in this setting would protect vulnerable service mem-
bers from exploitation while simultaneously undermining the religious options
of service members seeking deep and sustained religious counsel at a moment of
personal truth.
In light of the constitutional sensitivities at either pole of this problem, it
is both remarkable and disquieting that the armed forces currently provide no
meaningful guidance to chaplains on how to respond in this context of pastoral
care. A chaplain in a deployed setting would violate no current military chap-
laincy regulations by offering aggressive religious counsel, including explicit
efforts at conversion or inculcation of particular religious views, to troops who
sought pastoral care, even though such proselytizing is clearly prohibited by the
standards of CPE practice, and seems to be a condition of the constitutionality
of healthcare chaplaincy programs.511
The military's failure to adopt guidelines for pastoral care is under-
standable in political terms, given the turmoil occasioned by the services' prom-
ulgation of rules governing sectarian prayer at military ceremonies. 1 2 Some
chaplains' endorsing organizations and political groups, arguing that proselytiz-
101-02 (Winter 1992) (on forward deployment of Army chaplains); HUTCHESON, supra note 238,
at 84-85 (provision of chaplains in smaller units).
510 Phillips, supra note 239, at 4-5.
511 See supra notes 490-507 and accompanying text (discussing decisions involving public
healthcare chaplaincy programs).
512 See supra notes 415-30 and accompanying text (discussing furor over Air Force and Navy
proposals to prohibit sectarian prayer at military ceremonies).
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ing is an essential part of their religious ministry, would inevitably attack any
rule that prohibited or limited chaplains from using aggressive religious persua-
sion in these situations. 13
But the strategy of avoidance in this context is not constitutionally de-
fensible. In contrast to ceremonial prayer, which always occurs in the openness
of public gatherings, the practice of pastoral care takes place in private, and of-
ten in situations of great emotional and spiritual distress. That distress renders
those who seek pastoral care vulnerable to undue influence or even exploitation.
In such circumstances, the issuance of constitutionally appropriate
guidelines would be salutary. A set of adequate guidelines would explicitly
recognize the dilemma presented by pastoral care on the battlefield, and recog-
nize as well the inevitably interactive quality of pastoral counseling in that set-
ting. A service member seeking a bit of religious guidance may end up getting
far more than he bargained for, while others may be ill-served by a chaplain's
reticence to fully engage the religious dimensions of the moment. Pastoral care
by military chaplains is justified as a religious accommodation for the needs of
service members, but the administration of that practice must be responsive to
those needs-including needs borne of their particular vulnerability in the very
settings that call for the existence of the chaplaincy. At the very least, the mili-
tary should prohibit pro-active, chaplain-initiated religious persuasion by chap-
lains in any context in which service members might be regarded as both vul-
nerable and deprived of adequate choice of religious confidant.51 4 As in the
CPE model of pastoral care, the structure of accommodation demands a care-
fully calibrated degree of reticence on the part of chaplains. They may share
their own faith if invited by the service member, but pastoral care should not be
seen as an opportunity to evangelize. Pastoral care, like other aspects of the
military chaplaincy, exists for the purpose of serving the religious needs of ser-
vice members as those needs are expressed by the service members themselves.
Guidelines and training for pastoral care at the frontier of danger should
thus explicitly point chaplains and their supervisors in the direction of sensitive
appraisal of a service member's religious background and self-articulated spiri-
tual needs. Under such a regime, which neither banned nor explicitly invited
513 The arguments made in defense of sectarian prayer at military ceremonies would apply with
equal-and perhaps even greater-force to the context of pastoral care. Although public invoca-
tions at official ceremonies may plausibly be construed as "secular" acts, the conduct of pastoral
care resists any such construal. The "pastoral" quality of a chaplain's counsel reflects its religious
character, which distinguishes the care from standard secular counseling or therapy. Mandatory
embrace of the CPE model's religious pluralism would seem to reflect even more an "establish-
ment" of a particular religious view, and constraint on chaplains' religious liberty, than the brief
non-sectarian prayers of military ceremonies. Nonetheless, the arguments offered by opponents of
the CPE model are unlikely to be any more successful than opponents of CPE in the healthcare
chaplaincy context, or than the opponents of the services' policies for public prayer.
514 In Katcoff v. Marsh, the court accepts and relies on the military's representation that prose-
lytizing is prohibited, though such a prohibition is not clearly reflected in any military regulation.
755 F.2d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 110
76
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss1/10
INSTRUMENTS OF ACCOMMODATION
religious persuasion, service members would be neither deprived of desired reli-
gious support nor exploited at a moment of maximum physical and spiritual
vulnerability. Instead, chaplains would be instructed to put the religious needs
and desires of service members, rather than the chaplain's own view of the path
to salvation, at the forefront of the mission of pastoral care. As we see it, this is
a generic norm in the context of pastoral care, but it has acute and special force
on the battlefield.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this paper, we suggested that the multiplicity of Estab-
lishment Clause tests and standards had led many courts and commentators
astray in their approach to the military chaplaincy. As time and circumstances
have repeatedly revealed, the law of the Establishment Clause cannot be boiled
down to a single test or standard. Instead, the Supreme Court's decisions in the
field cluster around a set of such tests or standards, each appropriate to its own
particular context.
The military chaplaincy can best be appraised through the legal prism of
permissive accommodation. When the institution is so viewed, its basic features
appear to fit comfortably within our constitutional tradition. Various aspects of
the institution, however, require close and careful consideration of a variety of
constitutional and statutory concerns. These concerns do not always point in the
same direction. We remain convinced, however, that both the overarching and
particularistic evaluation of the chaplaincy can be accomplished effectively only
within the framework of permissive accommodation of religion, and with the
regard for military judgment that follows from application of that framework.
As is true of much of military life, the interests of individuals must be
frequently subordinated to overarching concerns of the armed forces as an insti-
tution. Thus, many-though not all-complaints by chaplains about restrictions
on the time, place, or content or their religious expression are without merit.
The individuals whose interests are to be preserved in the context of the chap-
laincy are those service members whose religious experience depends on a vi-
brant, yet appropriately obedient, corps of chaplains.
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